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A Required Yield Theory of Stock Market Valuation and Treasury 
Yield Determination 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Stock market valuation and Treasury yield determination are consistent with the Fisher effect 
(1896) as generalized by Darby (1975) and Feldstein (1976). The U.S. stock market (S&P 500) is 
priced to yield ex-ante a real after-tax return directly related to real long-term GDP/capita growth 
(the required yield). Elements of our theory show that: 1) real after-tax Treasury and S&P 500 
forward earnings yields are stationary processes around positive means; 2) the stock market is 
indeed priced as the present value of expected dividends with the proviso that investors are 
expecting fast mean reversion of the S&P 500 nominal growth opportunities to zero. Moreover, 3) 
the equity premium is mostly due to business cycle risk and is a direct function of below trend 
expected productivity, where productivity is measured by the growth in book value of S&P 500 
equity per-share. Inflation and fear-based risk premia only have a secondary impact on the 
premium. The premium is always positive or zero with respect to long-term Treasuries. It may be 
negative for short-term Treasuries when short-term productivity outpaces medium and long run 
trends. Consequently: 4) Treasury yields are mostly determined in reference to the required yield 
and the business cycle risk premium; 5) the yield spread is largely explained by the differential of 
long-term book value per share growth vs. near term growth, with possible yield curve inversions. 
Finally, 7) the Fed model is partially validated since both the S&P 500 forward earnings yield and 
the ten-year Treasury yield are determined by a common factor: the required yield. 
 
 
Keywords: Fisher Effect, Required Yield, Earnings Yield, Equity Premium, S&P 500 Valuation, 
Fed Model, Treasury Yields, Yield Spread, Productivity, and Book Value of Equity per Share 
Growth. 
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A few key principles have fundamentally shaped the way financial economists think about asset 
pricing. It is a broad consensus in the profession that stock market prices must be closely related 
to the present value of expected dividends or free cash flows to equity (Williams, 1938); that the 
equity premium must be related to the risk differential between Treasuries and stocks 
(Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 2005); and that ex-ante interest rates must factor a compensation for 
expected inflation (Fisher, 1896). While these principles are considered cornerstones of Finance, 
it is quite confounding that the cumulated empirical record of the past four decades has delivered 
only little support for these principles. Far from elucidating how these principles manifest in the 
data, the Finance field has faced one puzzle after another regarding the behavior of stock prices 
and interest rates. 
• Puzzle #1: Why are stock market prices more volatile than expected dividends (Shiller, 1981; 
Campbell and Shiller, 1988a and 1988b)? 
• Puzzle #2: Why is the equity premium not accounted for by standard measures of risk and 
our best asset pricing models (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Kocherlakota, 1996; Mehra, 2003)? 
• Puzzle #3: Why aren’t stocks behaving as an inflation hedge instrument, as common sense 
would dictate (Bodie, 1976; Nelson, 1976; Feldstein, 1980; Fama, 1981; Geske and Roll, 
1983)? 
• Puzzle #4: Why aren’t stock returns (Ritter, 2005) and Treasury yields more directly 
connected to measures of productivity/economic growth? 
• Puzzle #5: Why does the yield spread appear to be a good predictor of real economic cycles 
(Harvey, 1989; Mishkin, 1991; Estrella and Mishkin, 1996; Kozicki, 1997)? 
• Puzzle #6: Why do Treasury yields and the stock market earnings yield appear to behave as 
non-mean reverting processes (Tatom, 2002; Weigand and Irons, 2007) when stock market 
returns are found to be mean-reverting in some instances (Balvers, Wu and Gilliland, 2000)? 
• Puzzle #7: Why is the so-called Fed model (Lander, Orphanides and Douvogiannis, 1997) 
linking government bond yields with market P-E ratios found to be a global empirical 
regularity (Thomas, 2005), in spite of its perceived logical flaws (Asness, 2003)? 
Much progress has been made in the areas of stock market valuation (Ohlson, 1995; Dechow, 
Hutton and Sloan, 1998; Lee, Myers and Swaminathan, 1999; Lee and Swaminathan, 1999; 
Bakshi and Chen, 2005 and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005) and bond pricing (Vasicek, 
1977; Cox, Ingersoll and Ross, 1985; Heath, Morton and Jarrow, 1992 and Ang and Piazzesi, 
2003). However, no unified stock and bond market valuation theory has been offered, which 
resolves the empirical puzzles noted above. 
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In this article, we introduce a general theory for valuing a broad market index (S&P 500) and 
for determining the yield on Treasuries of various maturities. Required Yield Theory (RYT) 
demonstrates that the behavior of stock market prices/returns and Treasury yields is consistent 
with the cornerstone principles stated above. In other words, we are able to provide an 
explanation for each of the seven puzzles listed above based on these well-accepted principles. 
Required Yield Theory is founded on the Fisher effect (1896) generalized by Darby (1975) 
and Feldstein (1976). The two latter authors analyze how nominal interest rates are impacted by 
personal taxes, given that investors want to earn a constant real after-tax return ex-ante. We go a 
step further and argue that this real after-tax return is related to long-term real GDP/capita 
growth, which we term the required yield. 
To value the S&P 500, we express the index’s price as a function of two components, 1) a 
perpetuity based on after-tax forward earnings, and 2) the after-tax present value of growth 
opportunities. Our approach parallels Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth’s (2005) abnormal earnings 
growth model. The difference is that we account for the effect of personal marginal taxes. 
We introduce a novel condition that the present value of expected growth opportunities 
mean-reverts to zero, which is consistent with the evidence of mean reversion of aggregate 
earnings growth and corporate profitability (Fama and French, 2000), as well as the evidence in 
favor of mean reversion of returns (Balvers, Wu and Gilliland, 2000). We derive a compact 
formula for the present value of growth opportunities and the stock market price as a function of 
deviations of the growth rate of book value of equity-per-share from long-term GDP/capita 
growth, and the speed(s) of mean reversion. 
We argue that the marginal investor is the highest bidder for the index and thus gets a 
minimum acceptable after-tax real expected return from equities, which turns out to be the 
required yield. The reason that the required yield is an absolute minimum return is that in the 
long run, the S&P 500 real capital gains rate converges to real GDP/capita growth and thus 
constitutes a floor average yearly return, simply by using a long-term buy and hold strategy.1 
Treasuries also provide an alternative minimum (nominal before-tax) return. Thus, investors 
arbitrage between the two asset classes to get the best after-tax real return available. At each 
point in time, the highest bidder puts downward pressure on the index’s earnings yield to obtain 
the greater of two expected returns: the required yield vs. the best real after-tax Treasury yield 
available. Using quarterly data, our stock market valuation model fits the S&P 500 forward 
                                                     
 
1 Section 1014 of Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows for a stepped up basis of unrealized capital gains upon 
transfer of stock ownership to descendants, essentially eliminating capital gains taxes. 
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earnings yield with an adjusted R-squared of 88% over Q4 1953- Q3 2006  and 94% over Q4 
1978- Q3 2006. We track the S&P 500 forward earnings yield (inverse P-E) with about 19% 
more accuracy than the Fed model over the whole sample period. 
Because our theory predicts that the S&P 500 is priced in relation to a constant real after-tax 
return, it is fair to wonder how the equity premium fits in our analysis. While there has been 
recent progress made to explain the factors at the source of the equity premium (Bansal and 
Yaron, 2004), we adopt a different approach. Because stocks and bonds are taxed at different 
rates, we postulate that both the after-tax Fisher effect and the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) in its after-tax version (Brennan, 1970) hold true. Hence, we capture the (after-tax) 
equity premium as the difference between the nominal required yield and the after-tax yield on a 
Treasury yield (for a given maturity). 
To understand the risk factors that cause the equity premium, we decompose the equity 
premium into three components: inflation risk, business cycle risk and fear-based risk premia. 
The first two types of risk are quantifiable economic risks. Fear-based risk is psychological and 
due to the perception of possible catastrophic events and cannot necessarily be inferred from real 
economy forecasts. We then create a measure of business cycle risk based on productivity 
growth slowdowns. We show theoretically and empirically that the equity premium is principally 
due to business cycle risk. In other words, there cannot be a sustained premium in excess of the 
required yield over long-term horizons, given that the fear-based risk and inflation risk typically 
are transient phenomena. 
Specifically, we show that the after-tax premium is mostly accounted for by how much short-
term productivity growth falls below longer-term productivity trend(s). In our analysis, 
productivity growth is measured by the growth of book value of equity per share for the S&P 
500, which is akin to the sustainable growth rate of corporate earnings. When the economy 
under-performs, the “short-term” growth rate of book value falls below the trend, and the 
premium is positive. In that case, the (business cycle) risk faced by an investor is that the index’s 
sustainable rate of earnings growth may not revert to the level anticipated over the investor’s 
hedging horizon. On the other hand, zero or even negative risk premia may prevail when near-
term productivity outpaces the trend(s). Because S&P 500 book value per-share growth closely 
follows GDP/capita growth, an immediate consequence of this approach is that our measure of 
the equity risk premium increases during economic contractions and shrinks during economic 
expansions. This result is consistent with the stylized fact that the equity premium is indeed 
countercyclical (Ferson and Harvey, 1991). 
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An implication of this analysis is that it allows for the determination of Treasury yields. This 
constitutes a validation test for our equity premium approach. Long-term Treasuries return less 
than the required yield after-tax when the risk premium associated with the business cycle is 
positive; otherwise, they return exactly the required yield. As long-run productivity growth 
tracks long-run GDP/capita growth, the after-tax premium for the thirty-year bond must 
essentially be zero.2 In our model, short-term Treasuries may return more than the required yield 
in periods of abnormally high short-term productivity growth; otherwise, they return less than the 
required yield when the risk premium is positive. 
This approach is empirically validated, as we find that our model fits the actual behavior of 
the thirty-year, ten-year and one-year Treasuries, with adjusted R-squares over 66% in all cases. 
We also find that the yield spread is very well captured by our theory with adjusted R-squares 
above 58% in the two sample periods: Q4 1953- Q3 2006  and Q4 1978- Q3 2006 . More 
importantly, our model accurately matches ten yield curve inversions out of twelve over the 
whole sample period. 
A by-product of our theory is that we vindicate the so-called ‘Fed’ model (Lander, 
Orphanides and Douvogiannis, 1997) and rationalize why that model works well empirically: 
both the yields on the stock market and long-term Treasuries are tied to the required yield.  
The rest of the article is as follows. In section 1, we offer new evidence that the stock market 
total return, the forward earnings yield and Treasury yields are stationary processes, on an after-
tax and real basis. In section 2, we develop a new valuation model and show that the stock 
market (S&P 500) can be valued with great accuracy assuming the Fisher effect holds ex-ante 
and that the after-tax real return is a function of the required yield. In section 3, we show that the 
required yield is a minimum expected return and ends-up being the yearly stock market return in 
a steady-state without business cycle risk. This begs the question of how the equity premium fits 
in our required yield approach. We assert that the equity premium is largely related to the 
business cycle risk. In section 4, we finalize our stock market valuation formula taking the 
multiple risk factors into account. In section 5, we focus on characterizing a new measure of the 
equity premium based on our definition of business cycle risk. In section 6, we draw implications 
for the determination of the yields on the thirty-, ten- and one-year Treasuries. Section 7 contains 
a review and discussion of the literature on inflation illusion and the Fed model in light of our 
                                                     
 
2 Except when a fear-based premium is present. Glassman and Hassett (1999) argue that the equity premium is 
essentially zero for long-run investors. While not going as far as we do here, Prescott and McGrattan (2001) argue 
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results, as well as a discussion of why the ex-post equity premium has been historically large. 
Section 8 revisits the seven outstanding puzzles of Finance listed previously, in light of our 
theory. The last section contains our concluding remarks and explores possible extensions. 
 
1. The Fisher/Darby/Feldstein Effect: Evidence for the Mean-Reversion of Stock Market 
and Treasury Returns on a Real After-Tax Basis  
The Fisher effect is a cornerstone of financial economics. While the basic idea can be traced 
back to several economists a century earlier (Dimand, 1999), Fisher’s Appreciation and Interest 
(1896) is the first formal exposition that the ex-ante nominal interest rate should compensate 
investors for anticipated inflation in order to preserve an equilibrium real interest rate. In theory, 
the equilibrium real interest rate is determined by the marginal productivity of capital and 
marginal rate of impatience.3 Darby (1975) and Feldstein (1976) extend this concept and argue 
that investors seek compensation for the cost of personal taxes in addition to expected inflation 
in order to achieve a constant ex-ante after-tax real return.4 
In this section, we shed a new light on the empirical evidence about the Fisher (1896) effect 
and its generalization by Darby (1975) and Feldstein (1976). We examine the stationarity (or 
mean-reversion) of time series such as Treasury yields, S&P 500 total return and forward 
earnings yield (inverse P-E ratio) using after-tax real yields. In other words, we verify whether 
the stock market and Treasury instruments have a strong statistical tendency to yield a constant 
real after-tax return. 
From a broader perspective, the literature has generally been interested in the question of 
whether stock market returns and interest rates tend to revert back to a mean. Intuitively, if 
returns are connected to measures of productivity or profitability, which are found in some 
instances to be mean-reverting, the time series of returns for major asset classes such as stocks 
and Treasuries should also exhibit mean reverting behavior (Fama and French, 2000; Balvers, 
Wu and Gilliland, 2000). 
Poterba and Summers (1988) find that stock market returns are negatively autocorrelated 
over the long-term. However, Lo and McKinley (1988) dispute this conclusion and argue that 
returns follow a random walk using weekly data.  Balvers et al. (1997) document that stock 
market returns do indeed exhibit mean-reverting behavior, by focusing on how several 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
that the equity premium measured in reference to long-term debt has been close to zero on a tax-adjusted basis; due 
to what they view is a small systematic risk premium. 
3 Fisher (1896). 
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international stock markets return series converge to a common trend. On the other hand, mean-
reversion has been empirically rejected for the ten-year Treasury (Bradley and Lumpkin; 1992; 
Mehra, 1996; Tatom, 2002) and for the stock market earnings yield and its inverse, the stock 
market P-E (Estrada, 2006; Weigand and Irons, 2007). 
The appropriate method to investigate the stationarity of time series is a unit-root test. One 
widely used procedure is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Hamilton, 1994). This test 
establishes whether a particular time series behaves as a random walk with no trend, or has a 
stochastic trend, or mean reverts to a trend or a constant level. For any time series , the test is 
implemented by first differencing the series and estimating the coefficients of the following 
relationship: 
tY
0 1 1
1
N
t t
i
Y T Yβ β δ ηi t iY− −
=
Δ = + + + Δ∑  
The drift term is 0β ; the slope on the time trend is 1β ; the slope on the lagged value is δ  and the 
lagged differenced values coefficients are the iη s, with N possible lags. The null hypothesis of 
non-stationarity is that the coefficient  δ  is zero. 
It is worth stressing that for these tests we use data on current marginal (dividend and 
interest) income and long-term capital gains tax rates. The tax rate applied to the earnings yield 
is the blended tax rate, where the dividend payout ratio is the weight applied to dividend taxes 
and the retention ratio is applied to capital gains taxes. While we use the standard Survey of 
Professional Forecasters for measuring expected inflation, this data is only available since 1970. 
For our expected inflation data prior to 1970, we rely on a quarterly macro business survey that 
began in the late 1940s (Thies, 1986). Appendix A gives a detailed description of the data. 
In Table 1, we offer three alternate specifications/regressions for the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test. The baseline test in Panel A assumes no drift and no trend. Panel B shows the test 
with drift. Finally Panel C shows the test with drift and possible trend. We report the coefficients 
on the slope of the Dickey-Fuller regressions. The null hypothesis for non-stationarity is that the 
slope coefficient is zero. We report the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz 
criterion (BIC) as two model selection statistics. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
4 Darby (1975) uses a static framework, and Feldstein (1976) studies the steady-state in a growing economy. 
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Our first finding is that total market return (annualized quarterly total return) does not appear 
to be stationary in nominal terms.5  In Table 1, the slope coefficients become less significant as 
the lag increases from 0 to 4, while the AIC and BIC statistics are decreasing in value, which 
indicates better models. We also tested alternative Augmented Dickey-Fuller specifications with 
no-drift or trend for the total S&P 500 return nominal, by varying the number of lags beyond the 
values reported in the Table. The optimal number of lags to maximize AIC and BIC criteria is 
found to be 28, which seems excessive given our sample size. For this specification of 28 lags, 
the t-statistics value for the slope is 1.17, implying that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity 
cannot be rejected at the 5% level (critical value = 1.95). This result is not very surprising given 
the mixed evidence in support of the mean reversion of ex-post stock market returns.  
On the other hand, when testing for mean reversion of the real-after-tax total market return, 
we find that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected. In particular, Panel B shows 
that the best model (which minimizes the AIC and BIC criteria) is the model with drift and zero 
lags.6 The slope and drift coefficients are both significant at the 1% level. This indicates that ex-
post market returns do indeed exhibit a mean reversion property, contrary to what is generally 
found in the literature. This result is our first finding in support the Fisher/Darby/Feldstein 
hypothesis. 
Notwithstanding, the Fisher effect (1896) may be better assessed by testing the stationarity of 
ex-ante measures of returns such as Treasury yields and the S&P 500 forward earnings yield. In 
that respect, Table 1 documents a novel finding regarding the behavior of Treasury yields and of 
the S&P 500 earnings yield. For the one-year and ten-year Treasuries and the S&P 500 forward 
earnings yield, while there is some evidence in favor of stationarity in nominal terms, the 
evidence for stationarity is noticeably stronger once the series are adjusted by removing expected 
inflation and marginal personal taxes. This again confirms the Darby/Feldstein version of the 
Fisher effect.  
First, when examining the specifications for before-tax nominal yields in Panels A and C, we 
find that none of the slopes coefficients are significant at the 5% level for nominal yields, which 
could lead us to conclude erroneously that these series are indeed non-stationary. But looking at 
                                                     
 
5 We use annualized quarterly returns to avoid the autocorrelation problems that overlapping yearly returns would 
create with quarterly observations. 
6 We use the actual GDP deflator to calculate real total market returns. Elder and Kennedy (2001) argue that it 
makes better economic sense to incorporate a drift term but not a trend term in unit-root tests that involve returns, 
because these time series should neither be growing nor decaying and are likely to be centered around a positive 
constant mean (drift term). 
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Panel B which includes a drift term, we can reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at the 
5% confidence level for all lag specifications. 
Our results contrast with the conclusions reached by Weigand and Irons (2007) and Estrada 
(2006).7 Weigand and Irons (2007) use a structure with six to twelve lags applied to monthly 
data. One possible reason for this difference is that these authors do not apply model selection 
criteria as we do here to determine the best lag structure. Estrada (2006) tests whether the log of 
the market P-E ratio is stationary in several western economies. This may be problematic as the 
P-E ratio can exhibit explosive behavior especially when the market earnings yield drops down 
near a value of zero and thus is bounded below. In other words, the log of P-E may appear to be 
non-stationary even though the earnings yield is. 
 On the other hand, turning to real after-tax earnings yield and Treasury series in Panels B 
and C, we observe that all coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level, and above the 1% 
level for lags equal to 1 or 0. Applying the procedure of minimizing the information criteria for 
choosing the best specification, we find that Panel B’s specification with a drift term and 0 lag is 
the best model. From cursory examination of Panel C, it is clear that the trend terms are non-
significant for all lags and yields. Hence, the after-tax real yields on Treasuries and the S&P 500 
are best described as stationary series around constant non-stochastic means. Indeed, the reason 
why before-tax nominal series exhibit weaker stationary behavior may be due to the fact that 
inflation and tax rates have exhibited clear downward trends over the period. Figure 1 illustrates 
the behavior of the forward earnings yield and the ten-year Treasury on an after-tax and real 
basis. 
Figure 1 (About here) 
Each return series converges to the mean-reversion constant given by the formula Drift/(-
Slope). This calculation gives 1.68% for the after-tax real ten-year Treasury, 1.25% for the after-
tax real one-year Treasury, 2.21% for the S&P 500 forward earnings yield and 5.15% for the real 
after-tax market (S&P 500) return. This compares to the actual respective sample mean values of 
1.73%, 1.29%, 2.30% and 5.23%. 
It is interesting to note that the value of the mean-reversion constant for the after-tax real 
forward earnings yield is very close to the value of long-run average real GDP/capita growth, 
which equaled 2.24% over the period 1929-2001 and 2.03% over 1929-2006. While this 
                                                     
 
7 Although the sample in the former study ends in 2003 and the second study sample ends in 2005, we do not believe 
this to be the main reason for the difference in results, since these periods along with our sample period, contain the 
market correction and ensuing resurgence that took place in the U.S. following the bubble of the late 1990s. 
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observation may appear coincidental, in the rest of the article, we develop a new theory of stock 
market valuation and Treasury yield determination to show that there is indeed a connection 
between Treasury yields, the forward earnings yield and long-term real GDP/capita growth, and 
that this connection is central for understanding how these assets are valued.8 
Table 1 (About here) 
 
2. Stock Market Valuation and the Mean Reversion of Growth Opportunities 
In this section, we develop a new formula for valuing a stock market index. We begin by 
expressing the index price as the sum of two components. The first component is a perpetuity 
based on after-tax one-year forward earnings and the second component is the after-tax present 
value of expected growth opportunities. This approach is fairly standard. However, the novelty is 
that we use the property of mean reversion of the present value of growth opportunities to zero at 
the market level. This property allows us to determine the market index price and forward 
earnings yield as a function of expected inflation, investors’ marginal tax rates and the expected 
growth rate of book value of equity per share. 
 
2.1. Taxes, growth opportunities and stock market valuation 
Our starting point is the conventional formula for the after-tax expected return on a common 
stock applied to a stock market index: 
  1 1  1 11
(1 ) (1 )( )E EE d t t c t t t
t
t t
D Pk
P P
τ τ+ + + +
+
− −= + P−   (1) 
The variable  is the after-tax expected nominal return. The variable  is the actual stock 
market price at time t,  is the expected price and 
1
E
tk + tP
1
E
tP+ 1
E
tD +  is the expected dividend next period. 
The parameters  1d tτ +  and  1c tτ +  respectively are the marginal dividend income and capital gains 
tax rates.9 
Equation (1) simply states that the after-tax market return is the sum of the after-tax dividend 
yield plus the after-tax capital gains. It is worth noting that equation (1) is fully consistent with 
                                                     
 
8 On the other hand, the real after-tax total market return is much greater than the value of average real GDP/capita 
growth. We explain in Section 7 how inflation and tax trends can account for this large ex-post return in excess of 
real GDP/capita growth. 
9 All expectations are conditional on the information available at time t. Note that later in the empirical section, we 
assume that dividends are taxed at the current income tax rate and that capital gains tax rates are long-term rates. 
This conforms to gains distribution regulations that apply to the mutual fund industry. However, the model is 
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the price being determined by the present value of expected dividends. Moreover, this 
formulation allows for time-varying expected nominal returns. Let 1tb +  = 1
1
E
t
E
t
D
e
+
+
 represent the 
expected dividend payout ratio. Rearranging equation (1) to bring the price on the left-hand side, 
we find that the fair value of the stock market has two components: 
 =tP
( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1
1 1
(1 ) (1 )1 (1 ) E EE c t t t t td t t c t t t
E E
t t
P P b eb b e
k k
ττ τ + + + ++ + + + +
+ +
⎡ ⎤− − − −− − − ⎣ ⎦+   (2) 
The first term on the right-hand side of (2) anchors the market price on a perpetuity, which 
depends on expected forward earnings 1
E
te + .
10 The second term on the right-hand side of (2) 
measures the after-tax expected present value of growth opportunities (PVGO) for the index. The 
PVGO is the capitalized difference between expected capital gains and retained earnings. Let us 
denote this second term by 1 11
1
(1 )E Et t t tE
t E
t
P P b e
PVGO
k
+ +
+
+
1+⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦= , and let the blended marginal tax 
rate (or weighted average marginal rate) be denoted by 1tτ + =  1 1  1 1(1 )d t t c t tb bτ τ+ + + ++ − , where the 
weights are given by the payout ratio 1tb +  and its complement, the plowback ratio . Thus, 
equation (2) can be rewritten as: 
1)t+(1 b−
  =tP 11  1
1
(1 ) (1 )
E
Et
t c tE
t
e PVGO
k
τ τ+ 1t+ +
+
− + − +   (3) 
Equation (3) is the time-varying after-tax version of the standard steady-state formula found 
in most investments textbooks (Reilly and Brown, 2006). In the next subsection, we analyze the 
mean-reverting behavior of the present value of expected growth opportunities 1
E
tPVGO +  to 
further pinpoint the market price and the earnings yield, each as a function of economic 
fundamentals. 
 
2.2. Mean reversion of expected growth opportunities and optimal dividend policy 
A well-accepted rule of rational capital budgeting is that corporations should a priori reject (and 
shut-down) projects having negative net present values. While in theory this selection process 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
general enough to account for tax-deferrals if needed; in that case, the correct tax rates to apply are effective yearly 
tax rates. 
10 Anchoring stock valuation on a forward earnings perpetuity is not new. Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth’s (2005) 
develop an abnormal earnings growth model to value a market index. Their model is a reformulation of the dividend 
discount model, which specifies the value of a stock in reference to this perpetuity, and explicitly models the source 
of growth opportunities. 
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should result in corporations maintaining positive PVGOs, it is possible that some companies in 
the early stages of their lifecycle have growth options that are no-longer viable. Some mature 
companies may suddenly see the demand for their product shrink. In these cases, the firm’s 
PVGO may temporarily end-up being negative, and if prolonged, this situation eventually leads 
to business closure. 
In that respect, S&P 500 index companies possess several interesting features. First, these are 
mostly mature firms. Given the stage of their lifecycle, mature firms generally have a harder time 
finding projects with positive net present values due to competitive pressures. Thus, positive 
abnormal growth is harder to sustain for the index as a whole. Notwithstanding, mature 
companies exhibiting signs of decay are replaced in the index by new ones having positive 
growth opportunities. Henceforth, the index continuously showcases a high proportion of 
thriving mature companies.11 
On the other hand, as discussed above, the index’s PVGO may temporarily become negative 
due to adverse business cycle conditions. Because mature firms are characterized by a lower 
systematic risk as compared to younger firms (Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan, 2002), they 
are more able to successfully implement cost-cutting measures and maintain adequate 
profitability in the midst of a down cycle. These companies can be expected to emerge back into 
positive growth opportunity range during expansionary phases. 
Thus, the index’s PVGO should on average follow the business cycle and gravitate toward a 
zero value. The index should generate positive PVGOs during expansions and exhibit shorter 
spells of negative PVGOs right before, or during recessions. We posit that investors are aware of 
this tendency and expect the index’s PVGO to mean revert to zero over time. Furthermore, the 
mean reversion should be faster from the negative PVGO range. Figure 2 illustrates that the 
actual S&P 500 PVGOs closely followed the business cycle over the period Q4 1953- Q3 
2006.12 
                                                     
 
11 The average company stays in the S&P 500 for about 10 years. While this replacement process may lead to some 
frictions or costs for managing the index because of buying more expensive newer companies and needed 
adjustments to the divisor, we believe that these adjustments do not disrupt the fundamental property that the S&P 
500 growth mimics average economic GDP growth. 
12 The construction of this variable is described in Appendix A. Fama and French (2000) argue that profitability as 
measured by NOPAT/Assets is mean-reverting with a faster speed from below trend. Balvers, Wu and Gilliland 
(2000) find that equity returns in eighteen international stock markets are mean reverting within 3 ½ years on 
average as compared to about 2 ½ years for Fama and French (2000). Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth’s (2005) 
argument is that abnormal growth occurs when expected earnings per share growth (cum dividend being reinvested) 
outpaces the required return. In that case, price converges to book value per share and the ROE matches the required 
return (Reilly and Brown, 2006). Philips (1999) documents that the S&P 500’s ROE has been close to the required 
return on average. 
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Figure 2 (About here) 
A second reason to expect mean reversion of the index’s PVGO has to do with the interaction 
of dividend policy with expected growth opportunities. It is often stated that companies with 
(positive) growth opportunities should pay little to no dividends, whereas companies 
experiencing or on the verge of experiencing a negative present value of growth opportunities 
should increase their dividend payout.  
Therefore, an obvious candidate for an optimal corporate dividend policy is to: 1) Pay all 
earnings as dividends (or repurchase shares), when the current PVGO is negative; 2) Retain 
earnings up to the point where the marginal investment has zero net present value; when the 
current PVGO is positive. In either case, this policy helps to drive the PVGO back to zero for 
S&P 500 firms, as the set of positive net present value projects is shrinking for these 
companies.13 
We model the formation of PVGO expectations as a mean-reverting process to zero:14 
  with 1 (1 )
E
t iPVGO PVGOγ+ = − t 1iγ γ=  when ; and0tPVGO ≥ 2iγ γ= when   (4)  0tPVGO <
Again, the variable  represents the expected PVGO conditional on period t information. 
The term  represents the actual PVGO at time t, and the parameters 
1
E
tPVGO +
tPVGO 1 20 1γ γ≤ ≤ ≤  
represent the respective annual speeds of mean-reversion to zero, with 1γ  being the reversion 
speed from above ( ) and 0>tPVGO 2γ  from below ( 0tPVGO < ). We assume that these 
parameters are constant. In Appendix B, we show that from any point in time t, when future tax 
                                                     
 
13See recommendation #2 of Allen and Michaely (2003). Our hypothesis is fully consistent with the Free Cash Flow 
hypothesis of Jensen (1986) and with the Maturity Hypothesis of dividend policy (Grullon, Michaely and 
Swaminathan, 2002). The papers by Gordon (1963) and Walters (1963) are the standard references for the thesis that 
dividend policy should be affected by the presence of varying growth opportunities. On the other hand, Modigliani 
Miller (1961) irrelevance of dividends proposition assumes that investment policy is set in advance and independent 
of dividend policy. For a comparison of the two competing theses, see Brennan (1971). In this paper, we implicitly 
assume that as the rate of investment increases and firms retain a larger portion of their earnings, decreasing returns 
set in and profit rates decline for mature firms. Obviously our optimal dividend scheme is subject to possible 
counter-incentives due to the tax code. For example, the retention ratio may be higher than optimal when dividends 
are taxed at a much higher rate than capital gains. Our argument also relies on the fact that most S&P 500 companies 
have a stable capital structure. Thus, we sidestep the fact that they could be paying higher dividends and still finance 
the same growth using cheaper debt. 
14 Contrary to what may appear at first glance, this set-up does not lead to a circularity problem. Our final valuation 
formula does not require us to know what the actual PVGOt is and thus what the current price is, which we are 
trying to predict. In practice, we use last quarter’s PVGO instead of the current PVGO to signal whether the current 
PVGO is positive or negative, since once again to find the current PVGO, we would need to know the current price. 
 13
rates and payout ratios are expected to remain constant, the combination of equations (3) and (4) 
leads to the following expression for the expected PVGO: 15 
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Equation (5) states that the expected PVGO equals the after-tax forward earnings perpetuity 
times an adjustment factor that accounts for the deviation of the before-tax required return 
/1
E
tk + 1(1 )tτ +−  away from the expected sustainable ROE (equal to the expected growth rate 1Etg +  
of book value divided by the retention ratio).16 Note that the greater the ROE as compared to the 
required return in equation (5), the greater the expected PVGO, which is a standard result. A 
high reversion speed 1γ  ( 2γ ) reduces the size of positive (negative) growth opportunities. 
To simplify notations, it is useful to refer to the adjustment factor in the PVGO formula (5) 
as the expected abnormal earnings growth component denoted by , 1
E
i tAEG + , and given by the 
relation 
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 for i = 1,2  (6) 
In other words, the PVGO equals the present value of capitalized abnormal earnings growth 
as shown for example in Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). Here, we have introduced a novel 
condition that growth opportunities mean-revert to zero. One advantage of modeling growth 
opportunities that way is that one avoids the arbitrary selection of the number and length of 
intermediate growth stages leading to the terminal steady-state growth price (Lee, Myers and 
 
15 Based on actual PVGO (see Appendix A for construction of this variable), we estimate the mean reversion 
parameters values at 1γ = 43.6%, and 2γ = 68% over the whole sample period. These parameters are significant at 
the 1% level. Our positive mean reversion parameter 1γ  is close to the estimate by Fama and French (2000) who 
find that the average mean reversion of profit rates is about 38% per year. They also find that the reversion speed 
from below is faster than from above. We acknowledge that assuming constant future payout ratios conditional on 
information obtained at time t is a bit restrictive, as we consider only the case of a one-time adjustment to the payout 
ratio. However, this adjustment is still in accordance with the optimal dividend policy discussed above. 
16 This difference must be positive (negative) to be consistent with having positive (negative). We 
discuss this constraint in Appendix B. 
1
E
tPVGO +
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Swaminathan, 1999; Lee and Swaminathan, 1999)17. A similar approach to ours is Dechow, 
Hutton and Sloan (1998), who use the residual income model of Ohlson (1995) and assume that 
the ROE of firms fades to the cost of equity. 
We determine the stock price by combining equations (3), (4) and (6), and obtain: 
 11  1
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With >0 and <0. Equation (7) states that the stock price equals the after-
personal tax forward earnings capitalized at a rate equal to the required return, times one plus the 
after-tax abnormal earnings growth factor. It is important to note that equation (7) is only 
operational as a valuation formula as long as the required return is known a-priori. In the next 
section, we introduce a set of logical propositions linking investors’ bidding behavior to the 
required return. These propositions lay the foundation for showing that the long-run GDP/capita 
growth rate (i.e. the required yield) is a key determinant of the required return . 
1, 1
E
tAEG + 2, 1
E
tAEG +
1
E
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3. The Fisher Effect, Personal taxes, After-Tax CAPM and the Required Yield 
3.1. The required yield is a minimum after-tax real expected equity return  
In this section, we demonstrate that the required after-tax real stock market return is related to 
real long-term GDP/capita growth (i.e. the required yield). 
Proposition 1 (Fisher/Darby/Feldstein Effect on Stock Returns): At each point in time, 
the stock market index’s price is set by the highest bidder (i.e. the marginal investor). The 
marginal investor will bid the highest price and thus obtain (ex-ante) the minimum 
acceptable holding period (after-tax real) return. The lower the investor’s marginal tax 
rate, the higher the bid. 
Proposition 1 essentially states that investors behave in accordance with the generalized Fisher 
(1896) effect (Darby, 1975; Feldstein, 1976) and price stocks to obtain a target minimum real 
return after-tax. While we postulate that there is such a minimum return, which is common to 
every equity investor, actual bidding behavior depends on the marginal investor’s tax rates. For 
example, it is possible that the maximum potential bid might be attributable to a long-term 
investor (e.g. member of a pension fund) who benefits from deferred taxes and therefore willing 
to pay a higher price than other investors. On the other hand, mutual funds are known to have 
much higher turnover ratios than pension funds (Hotchkiss and Strickland, 2003). Thus, when 
                                                     
 
17 In these two papers, the authors use forecast earnings for the first three years. Beyond year 3, forecast ROEs are 
calculated by assuming a gradual fading to median industry value. A terminal value is then generated over a finite 
horizon, which extends up to eighteen years. 
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the marginal trader is a portfolio manager trading on behalf of its clients, the members of the 
fund face a greater tax burden, and thus the actual highest bid may fall short of the potential 
maximum bid.18 
Proposition 2 (Required Yield): For a long-term investor, the average yearly real capital 
gains rate obtained by investing in the S&P 500 is equal to long-term real GDP/capita 
growth (required yield). The required yield constitutes a minimum average after-tax real 
return, obtainable with zero asymptotic yearly risk. 
The proof has several non-trivial steps. First, in an economy steady-state, it must be true that 
aggregate corporate earnings grow at the same rate as GDP.19 Because the S&P 500 market 
capitalization constitutes a stable fraction of the overall market and the growth of these 
companies tracks GDP, this argument must hold for the index as well. Secondly, in Appendix C 
we show that net new equity shares for the S&P 500 grow theoretically and empirically at the 
rate of population growth in a steady-state. Hence, earnings per share must grow at the rate of 
GDP/capita. Because the market P-E ratio is constant as well in the steady-state, capital gains 
must grow at the rate of GDP/capita as well. Finally, a buy and hold strategy with an infinite 
horizon guarantees an average yearly real after-tax return at least equal to real long-term 
GDP/capita growth, given that investors also receive dividends.20 
However, it is important to note that the above argument while describing the average return 
does not pinpoint the return obtained by the marginal investor in each period. The next Corollary 
helps in that matter. 
Corollary 2.1(The Fisher Golden Path): Assume that the rate of inflation is constant. In 
the absence of business cycle fluctuations and other (transient) risks, the required yield 
                                                     
 
18 Tax-efficient mutual funds may reduce their members’ tax burden for example by limiting portfolio turnover in 
order to avoid short-term capital gains taxes. It is also true that heterogeneous tax brackets may influence the 
argument. However, we assume that average marginal tax rates are the relevant rates, as participation in the stock 
market has spread to the general public with the enactment of the Investment Company Act in 1940. 
19 The argument is based on  Kaldor’s (1961) stylized facts documenting that the U.S. economy has been 
characterized by a constant nominal (and real) GDP growth rate that equals the growth rate of capital, with a stable 
factor income distribution (labor vs. capital). Diermeier, Ibbotson and Siegel (1984) use a similar argument that 
financial wealth grows at the same rate as GDP to conclude that the supply of aggregate returns on capital is set by 
the productivity of business. In the long-run, the growth of aggregate equity capital cannot be disconnected from the 
rate of GDP, because the corporate sector is the source of GDP growth. 
20 In the long-run, it is a known result that the standard deviation of annualized continuously compounded returns 
decreases in proportion to the square root of the time horizon, thus risk as measured by the yearly standard deviation 
of stock market returns over the horizon decreases to zero in the limit. That is, on average the rate of real 
GDP/capita is achievable as a minimum return without risk. Section 1014 of Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows 
assets to be transferred from one generation to the next on a stepped-up basis, which effectively eliminates capital 
gains taxes on unsold assets.  In practice, achieving this return as an actual minimum return will be made easier 
when the index is bought at P-E ratios less or equal to the long-run average level. Other strategies such as spreading 
initial investment over time will produce a portfolio’s average P-E ratio close to the market average P-E. In addition, 
a progressive divestment strategy will reduce the risk to zero faster over the long run. 
 16
constitutes an absolute minimum after-tax annual real return achievable by a marginal 
(short-term or long-term) investor in the S&P 500 year to year. 
This Corollary simply states that in the absence of business fluctuations/risk, the economy 
simply hums along its steady-state growth path, and in that respect, the real capital gains rate 
matches real GDP/capita growth year to year. In Appendix D, we argue that dividends are 
always large enough to pay for taxes on capital gains (per share), so that the required yield does 
indeed constitute a minimum after-tax yearly real return obtainable by any investor, not just 
investors following the buy and hold strategy described above. 
Thus, in this ideal state we call the Fisher Golden Path any marginal investor/highest bidder 
of the market index with either a short-term or long-term horizon must exactly earn real 
GDP/capita growth on an annual basis. Furthermore, because risk is absent, this return must be 
the riskless rate on Treasuries as well. Let us now turn to the question of how risk is incorporated 
in a more realistic economy subject to the business cycle. 
 
3.2. Business cycle risk, the CAPM and the required yield  
In the previous section, while we have shown that the required yield is a minimum long-run 
after-tax real return in the absence of business cycle fluctuations, we have not yet answered the 
critical question of how risk affects the required return. To help answer this question, we first 
acknowledge the key role that business cycle fluctuations play in generating corporate earnings 
risk.  First, we propose a new definition of business cycle risk: 
Definition (Business Cycle Risk): is the risk that while the economy is entering a 
downward phase of the business cycle or during a business downturn, productivity 
growth will not rise to the projected level consistent with mean reversion to the trend, 
and over the investor’s relevant horizon. 
Burmeister, Roll and Ross (1994) define risk as unanticipated changes in the level of the overall 
business activity. Here, we posit that rational economic agents do anticipate the mean reversion 
of macroeconomic productivity.21 In this article, we define risk as the possibility that upward 
mean-reversion does not occur over the horizon relevant to the investor. The relevant horizon is 
defined as the one over which the investor wants to hedge against risk. 
Obviously, this risk would be eliminated if the business cycle did not exist. Then, the 
required yield would be the benchmark return that investors are targeting. The reason we are 
focusing exclusively on business cycle risk is that business cycle fluctuations are the chief cause 
                                                     
 
21 Given that the business cycle is caused by a series of exogenous shocks to the economy, and that these shocks are 
unpredictable, forecasters should find it virtually impossible to predict troughs and peaks of the business cycle. 
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of systematic risk for corporate earnings growth and thus must logically be the source of the 
equity risk premium, almost by definition.22 The next step is to analyze how the required stock 
market return is determined in relation to the risk premium on an after-tax basis. 
To proceed with the analysis we must first point out that the Finance field appears to hold 
two separate views of how the required return on stocks is determined. In one strand of the 
literature, ex-ante returns are assumed to conform to the Fisher effect, which has often been 
interpreted to say that the real ex-ante return is a constant over time (Fama and Schwert, 1977; 
Boudoukh and Richardson, 1993). On the other hand, the literature based on the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) treats the equity premium as a building block in the determination of the 
required stock return, which is viewed as time-varying (Ibbotson and Chen, 2003; Fama and 
French, 2002). Our theory offers a synthesis of these two distinct but not mutually exclusive 
views. To integrate the equity premium in our analysis we postulate that the 
Fisher/Darby/Feldstein effect holds in conjunction with an after-tax version of CAPM similar to 
Brennan’s (1970).23 
Proposition 3 (After-tax Fisher Effect and After-tax CAPM Combined): Assume that 
there are no other risks than business cycle risk. Year to year on an after-tax basis, the 
marginal investor expects to earn the nominal required yield (long-run real GDP/capita 
growth + one-year inflation forecast), which compensates him for taking on business 
cycle risk, if and only if the Nominal Required Yield = Nominal Risk-Free Rate + 
Business Cycle Risk Premium. 
Proposition 3 essentially states that the required yield is the annual real return required by 
investors if and only if the business cycle risk premium (equity premium) coincides with the 
difference between the nominal required yield and the nominal risk-free rate on an after-tax 
basis.24 This proposition is logically trivial given our premise. However, it is not economically 
obvious because we assert that the CAPM return is constant in real after-tax terms.  In the 
standard CAPM approach the market return varies on a real-after tax basis with the magnitude of 
the equity premium. Here we postulate that the required yield already includes the business cycle 
premium. 
                                                     
 
22 Longstaff and Piazzessi (2004) argue that corporate earnings are an important factor in explaining the equity 
premium due their volatility in response to business cycle shocks. 
23 Boudoukh, Richardson and Withelaw (1994) show that the standard dynamic asset pricing model of Lucas (1978) 
is compatible with the Fisher effect. However, they do not address the issue of the equity premium and the effect of 
taxes and do not tie the real return to long-run GDP/capita growth. While Brennan (1970) works with the effect of 
personal tax rates on the original CAPM framework, he expresses his results on a before-tax basis. 
24 We choose to present the proposition in terms of nominal returns because the relevant inflation rate may vary 
depending on the marginal investor’s horizon while the nominal required yield (on the equity index) is defined using 
one-year inflation forecast. 
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Proposition 3 sets-up a joint hypothesis about the stock market ex-ante return being the 
required yield and the equity premium being exclusively caused by business cycle risk. We 
postulate that investors regard the Fisher Golden Path as the ideal state to come back to. While 
there is risk associated with delayed mean reversion, rational market participants still conjecture 
that mean reversion will take place and therefore that over the long-run, business cycle risk 
should not impede the returns promised along the Fisher Golden Path. 
The fact that business cycle risk jointly determines the risk-free rate in relation to the 
required yield is analogous to an insurance scenario where investors must sacrifice some upside 
return in exchange for the certainty of not losing real principal. This insurance is achieved by 
investing in the Treasury instrument that provides hedging over the pertinent horizon. It remains 
to show that Proposition 3 is empirically validated. This issue will be addressed in Section 5. In 
this next subsection, we pursue our analysis of the other risk factors influencing the equity risk 
premium. 
 
3.3. Treasuries arbitrage, and other risk factors 
It is important to emphasize at this point that investors do have access to an alternate minimum 
nominal return, by investing in Treasury instruments.25 Thus, it is natural for investors to 
arbitrage the stock market index vs. Treasuries by comparing the required yield with the 
minimum after-tax real yields expected from Treasuries, and demand to earn the greatest 
available return. Proposition 3 above asserts that the equity risk premium is associated with 
Treasury yields that are lower than the required yield. However, we recognize that on an after-
tax and real basis, Treasuries may in some instances return more than the required yield, for 
example when an inflation risk premium is present. Other factors such as financial assets tax 
reforms or yield curve inversions may also drive the level of Treasury yields above the required 
yield. 
In other words, other types of risks and factors may be present besides business cycle risk, 
which in turn affect the equity premium. These risks may drive investors to bid a lower market 
price than the price justified by the required yield.  At the macro level, these types of risks fall 
into two remaining categories: 1) inflation risk and 2) confidence risk or what we call fear-based 
                                                     
 
25 We assume here that these Treasury yields with different maturities are directly substitutable from the marginal 
investor’s standpoint given his /her hedging horizon. We realize this is a rough approximation because of price and 
reinvestment risk. 
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risk.26 Inflation risk is due to the uncertainty associated with future unanticipated inflation 
shocks. As shown previously, in the long-run, the growth of earnings per share is tied to 
GDP/capita growth, i.e. the required yield. Similarly, in the long run, the nominal growth of 
corporate earnings is essentially indexed with actual inflation, as costs and revenues must on the 
whole rise with inflation.27 Although investors know that real long-term GDP/capita growth is 
independent of inflation shocks, they will still include an inflation risk premium because 
investors demand a nominal required yield, and unanticipated inflation may affect their ex-post 
real return. An inflation risk premium is also required on the bond side because the fixed cash 
flows and terminal value are not protected against unanticipated inflation.28 On the other hand, 
while it may be hard to predict the conditions leading to the onset of a fear-based risk premium, 
the presence of such a premium manifests as a flight to safety and thus drives the yields of 
intermediate and long-term Treasuries down and the required return on stocks up.29 
Let us define the variable 1
E
tR +  = 1
E
tg π 1t+ ++ + Φ  as the nominal required yield plus the fear 
premium, where the nominal required yield is the sum of  (long-term real GDP/capita growth 
rate) plus 
g
1
E
tπ +  the expected inflation rate over the next year. Let the variable 1tX +  represent the 
combination of an inflation risk premium and/or boosts to the minimum real return on the 
Treasury side for example due to a yield curve inversion. We can then express the after-tax stock 
market required return as =1
E
tk + 1 1t
E
tR X+ +
t
+ , which comprises the nominal required yield adjusted 
for the possible presence of a fear-based premium 1+Φ >0 and other premia aggregated in 1tX + .  
We determine the components of the variabl 1te X +  using the fact that the highest bidder 
seeks to arbitrage between the minimum return obtainable on the market index vs. Treasuries. 
Let us denote by 1
j
tr +  the after-tax nominal expected yield on a Treasury bond with maturity j = 
1, 10. As each Treasury yield already includes an inflation risk premium, the arbitrage condition 
                                                     
 
26 Burmeister, Roll and Ross (1994) define five types of risk. Here, we use three types of risks, business cycle risk, 
inflation risk and fear-based risk. Our business cycle risk is a combination of Burmeister, Roll and Ross’ own 
definition plus their time horizon risk and market timing risk. Our fear-based risk is akin to their confidence risk. 
Because we are dealing with widely traded assets (Treasuries and equity indexes) we attribute any potential liquidity 
premium for the whole term structure to the fear-based premium. 
27 Of course, there are recessionary periods where nominal earnings fall in spite of the presence of inflation 
pressures (stagflation). An inflation risk premium should still be present then.  
28 Investors can obviously get close to a minimum before-tax “real” return by investing in TIPS. The inflation risk 
premium has been shown to have a non-trivial effect on U.S. Treasury bonds (Shen, 1998). Conventional wisdom 
points to the inflation risk premium as having a larger effect on long-term maturity Treasuries. 
29 The net effect of the fear premium on short-term Treasuries should be nil. In the event of a disaster, short-term 
instruments should a-priori contain a fear-based risk premium. This would lower their yield. However, flight to 
safety to longer-term maturities then raises their yield back to the status quo. 
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implies that any excess real return provided by the other kinds of risk premia and factors listed 
above can be measured by the extra yield that Treasuries provide in excess of the required yield. 
Hence, we can therefore formulate .1 101 1 1 1{ ,
E E
t t t t tX Max r R r R+ + + + += − − 1,0}
1}t+
30 At the long-end of 
Treasury maturities the excess premium over the real required yield is mostly caused by an 
inflation risk premium. At the short-end of the yield curve, it is caused by yield curve inversions. 
Thus, the required after-tax stock nominal market return must be given by 
.  In other words, the required return on the equity side includes an 
inflation risk premium and allows investors to earn a minimum return that could temporarily 
outpace the required yield. This next proposition sums-up the arguments above. 
1 10
1 1 1{ , ,
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t t tk Max R r r+ + +=
Proposition 4 (Non business-cycle risk factors): The marginal investor seeks a higher 
after-tax nominal return than the required yield only when the equity premium is due to 
additional factors/risk(s) other than the risk associated with the business cycle. Such 
cases are: 1) when there is a fear-based premium or 2) when after-tax nominal 
Treasuries exceed the nominal required yield due to an inflation risk premium, a major 
tax reform, or a yield curve inversion. 
 
4. A New Stock Market Valuation Formula and the Effect of Inflation on Stock Prices 
Going back to our central equation (7), substituting the required return and rearranging terms, we 
can express the market earnings yield (inverse P-E) as follows: 31 
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 for i = 1,2  (8) 
tP
The marginal investor bids the market price up so that the market forward earnings yield equals 
the required yield, adjusted for growth opportunities and possible Treasury arbitrages. The bid 
also incorporates the fear-based premium, under the appropriate conditions.32 
Our market valuation formula (8) addresses one of the most enduring puzzles of Finance. It 
shows that a sudden rise in inflation expectations negatively impacts the stock market P-E ratio 
as documented for example by Sharpe (1999, 2001). This empirical finding has been interpreted 
 
30 By construction of the variable , is a one-year holding period expected return.  We include the 10-year 
Treasury in the analysis, because as we will see later it is consistent with a measure of expected one-year yield, 
which accounts for mean reversion of productivity. 
1
E
tk +
31 To be consistent with steady-state valuation our model implies that the dividend payout ratio must equal the 
blended tax rate in the steady-state. This is intuitive in the sense that the dividend payout is necessary to provide 
investors with a before-tax return large enough so that the required yield may be obtained after-tax. In a world with 
zero personal taxes on equity returns, we predict that the payout ratio would effectively be zero. Investors would bid 
stock prices up to eliminate the surplus return that free cash flows provide, this would lead to the same return as if 
firms were buying back shares.  That return would again be the required yield. 
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in the literature as a failure of stocks to provide an inflation hedge. While we agree with the 
literature that the stock price fails to be indexed with short-run changes in inflation expectations, 
it is still the case that the market required return does co-vary positively with expected inflation. 
Equation (8) implies that a shift in expected inflation affects market prices because: 1) the 
Fisher/Darby/Feldstein effect induces investors to want to earn ex-ante the required yield after 
inflation and taxes; and 2) real growth opportunities are impacted, because the corporate ROE 
does not adjust upward as quickly as the required nominal return in the event of a jump in 
expected inflation, which then drives the stock market price down. 
The latter effect is important enough to illustrate via a simple example. Assume the book 
value of equity is $1,000 and expected earnings are $20, with zero tax, zero payout and zero 
inflation, so that the ROE = 2%. Let the required yield match the ROE at 2%. When the rate of 
expected inflation suddenly rises, for example by 1%, the nominal required yield adjusts upward 
by the same 1% to a new value of 3%, because of the Fisher effect. However, the nominal ROE 
of 2% will not rise to 3% instantaneously, since earnings have increased only to $20.2, whereas 
to guarantee a ROE of 3%, earnings should have risen to $30. This means that, independently of 
real business cycle effects, a spike in expected inflation lowers the PVGO, since the real ROE 
immediately drops in value, then rises up slowly to its new level. In other words, higher expected 
inflation has the effect of reducing the set of acceptable projects with positive NPVs. 
In his book Stocks for the Long Run (2002), Jeremy Siegel briefly discusses linking the 
market P-E ratio to the Fisher/Darby/Feldstein effect. He states on pp. 119-120: “If we assume 
that investors bid stock prices up or down in response to changing taxes and inflation to obtain 
the same after-tax real return, we can calculate how shifts in these variables affect the P-E 
ratio.”33 Required Yield Theory makes it clear that this argument is indeed at the heart of 
understanding stock market valuation. 
Our theory allows for short-term or medium-term deviations from the pricing formula (8). 
These deviations may occur for several reasons: 1) economic, productivity or policy shocks that 
may lead to revisions of the equity risk premium, earnings forecasts, productivity trends, or 
inflation expectations not yet reflected in publicly available consensus experts’ opinions; 2) 
short-term noise trading. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
32 The fear premium is determined in Section 6. 
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4.1. Empirical fit of the S&P 500 earnings yield using Required Yield Theory vs. the Fed 
model 
In this section, we test the valuation formula (8). We empirically analyze the performance of our 
model on a quarterly basis over the period Q4 1953-Q3 2006 and study how the model stacks-up 
against the Fed model (Landers et. al, 1997). The data and variables are described in Appendix 
A. The reason we focus on quarterly data is because it is the highest frequency data available for 
standard surveys about U.S. inflation expectations over the period studied. 
Estimates of real long-term GDP/capita growth (required yield) are reported in Table 2. We 
report these values over three different horizons and the values range from 1.94% to 2.25%. For 
our empirical tests we use a value for the required yield of 2.21%, which falls within the narrow 
range of estimates for long-term real GDP/capita growth and matches the mean reversion 
constant for the after-tax real earnings yield. 
Table 2 (About here) 
Although the Fed model has received severe criticism from the academic community 
(Asness, 2003) is still one of the most widely used model by practitioners to value the S&P 500. 
A version of the Fed model popularized by Yardeni (2002) states that: 
 1 10-Year Treasury Yield
E
t
t
e
P
+ =   (9) 
We divide our sample into two periods: Q4 1953- Q3 2006 and Q4 1978- Q3 2006. We 
choose the second period beginning in 1979 because forward earnings forecasts became 
available only then. One issue we face is that our nominal variables are not stationary over the 
second subsample Q4 1978- Q3 2006. This may invalidate our regression analysis because we 
would not be able to rule out spurious relationships. In Appendix E, we present the regression 
analysis based on a uniform transformation of our variables. Essentially, we use after-tax real 
variables.34  The coefficients of each regression are estimated using the Newey-West estimation 
procedure. We correct for autocorrelation up to 4 lags, and also correct for heteroskedasticity. 
The adjusted R-squares and information criteria, our measures of overall fit, are obtained from 
simple OLS regressions using these transformed variables. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
33 Siegel also cites McGrattan and Prescott (2000). However, neither Siegel (2002) nor McGrattan and Prescott 
(2000) develop a full-blown theory based on a comprehensive approach covering the equity premium and the Fisher 
effect as we do here. 
34 Our tests reject non-stationarity of these series at the 1% level for most variables and 5% level in a couple of 
instances, for both sample periods. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 3 shows the statistical results of the performance of our model vs. the Fed model. It 
shows that based on the adjusted R-squared criterion the overall best model specification 
incorporates Treasuries arbitrage and mean reversion of PVGOs for both sample periods.  Our 
model explains 88% of the variability of the market forward earnings yield for the period Q4 
1953- Q3 2006 and 94% of the variability over Q4 1978- Q3 2006.  One alternate specification 
assuming that mean reversion is instantaneous (γ = 1) seems to be doing better for the Q4 1953- 
Q3 2006  in terms of its predictive ability based on the lowest value for information criteria (AIC 
and BIC). Other alternatives assuming that Treasuries arbitrage is absent are worse models in 
terms of fit. Our valuation formula appears to be between 8% and 19% more accurate than the 
Fed model across these samples based on adjusted R-squares. 
It is interesting to note that Required Yield Theory appears to value the S&P500 much more 
accurately than the Fed model prior to the 1970s. It is well documented that the ten-year T-Note 
did not track the S&P 500 earnings yield prior to 1970 but moved closely with the earnings yield 
since then. The slope coefficient on the real after-tax return is close to unity and the slope 
coefficients on the expected inflation variable are non-significant for the best model 
specification, as the theory predicts. Figure 3 graphically shows on a before-tax nominal basis 
the difference between the Fed model and our best performing RYT model that incorporates 
Treasuries arbitrage and mean reversion of growth opportunities.35 
Table 3 (About here) 
Figure 3 (About here) 
 
5. A New Characterization of the Equity Risk Premium on an After-Tax Basis 
5.1. The equity premium and the business cycle 
In Proposition 3 we defined the after-tax ex-ante equity premium as the difference between the 
nominal required yield vs. an after-tax Treasury yield (of a given maturity). We now provide an 
alternate measure of the equity premium based on business cycle risk and show that the required 
yield approach is consistent with the after-tax CAPM. We construct a new risk measure based on 
the gap between productivity vs. long-term trend when productivity dips below trend, in 
accordance with our definition of business cycle risk developed in Section 3. We first show that 
this measure logically accounts for the equity premium. Such measure would be of little use if it 
                                                     
 
35 Figure 3 shows a discrepancy of our model with actual S&P 500 forward earnings yield during the 1998-2000 
market bubble. This may appear inconsistent with our hypothesis of investors wanting a minimum absolute real 
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did not lead to good empirical predictions. In Section 6, we show that this new measure is a 
major determinant of actual Treasury yields. 
Even though investors bid to obtain the required yield ex-ante, there still is risk associated 
with short-term stock market volatility, which some long-term investors may want to hedge 
against, using Treasuries. In that context, risk-compensation has two interpretations: 1) in order 
to accept risk over the relevant horizon, investors want to earn a premium in excess of the 
riskless rate; or 2) in order to hedge against risk over the relevant horizon, investors have to pay 
an insurance premium, which brings their expected return down to the riskless rate.36 This latter 
interpretation is consistent with our definition of business cycle risk introduced in Section 3. The 
risk faced by investors is that below trend corporate productivity does not mean revert to its 
long-run trend with the reversion speed that is anticipated over the hedging horizon.37 Here, risk 
is viewed as the opportunity loss of not catching-up to the Fisher Golden Path. 
Because the equity premium is usually defined with respect to a specific Treasury instrument, 
we treat each Treasury’s maturity as a preferred horizon over which an investors may hedge and 
obtain a riskless return.38 To simplify the analysis we assume that there are three possible 
hedging horizons: short, intermediate and long-term. Corresponding to each horizon, we 
respectively use the one-year, ten-year and thirty-year Treasuries. Thus, the size of the premium 
depends on two factors: 1) the hedging horizon and 2) the comparison of corporate average 
productivity for a given horizon versus the productivity trend(s) relevant to that horizon. In that 
respect, risk will manifest when the measure of productivity over the relevant horizon drops 
below the trend(s). 
Recall from our previous section that while we measure the equity premium on a nominal 
and after-tax basis, this analysis preserves a constant after-tax real return in agreement with the 
Fisher/Darby/Feldstein effect, where real is defined according to the average inflation measure 
given the investor’s hedging horizon. Over a thirty year horizon, because average productivity 
essentially tracks long-term trend, the business cycle premium is zero. In other words, according 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
after-tax return. However, one possible explanation is that investors still aimed at earning the same minimum return, 
but anticipated greater future earnings than consensus estimates. 
36 This is for example the approach followed by Faugere and Van Erlach (2006). 
37 It is likely that investors attach some probability measure to this event. Although we do not integrate this feature 
in our analysis, our empirical results appear to validate our simpler approach. 
38 Fisher (2001) and Shen (2005) make the case that the marginal investor’s horizon matters for the defining the risk 
premium. Obviously, Treasuries are not strictly risk-free. For example, investors still face coupon reinvestment risk 
in the case of a ten-year or thirty-year Treasury, and principal reinvestment (or price) risk in the case of three-month 
and six-month T-bills, to obtain the quoted annual yield. In our case, we assume that the correct hedging instrument 
is the Treasury that matches the investor’s risk horizon. 
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to this definition of risk, the thirty-year Treasury should deliver a nominal after-tax yield equal to 
the nominal required yield.39 In the intermediate term (ten-year horizon), business cycle risk still 
is defined with respect to long-term trend productivity. However in this case, the intermediate 
trend matters as well. For that horizon, we define the business cycle premium as the greater of 
two gaps: 1) the gap between long-term productivity vs. intermediate term productivity and 2) 
the gap between intermediate-trend productivity and itself, i.e. zero. Thus, in the intermediate 
term, the equity premium is strictly positive, because shorter horizons do not matter to that 
category of investors. Obviously, the risk premium is small in that case because intermediate 
term productivity tends to be close to long-term productivity anyhow. 
In the short-run (one-year horizon), the business cycle premium is defined as the greater of 
two gaps: 1) the gap between intermediate-term productivity and immediate productivity vs. 2) 
the gap between short-term productivity (one-year) vs. immediate productivity. Investors with a 
short-term hedging horizon are concerned with the risk of being in an economic slowdown , or 
alternately, that the expected reversion of productivity to one-year and intermediate trends will 
not occur, when immediate productivity is currently below the short and intermediate-term 
trends. Why would the investor care about the intermediate trend in that case? Because, as we 
show later the intermediate horizon measure of productivity is also interpretable as another one-
year forecast that accounts for the mean reversion of productivity to its long-run trend. 
Notwithstanding, the premium may be negative with respect to short-term Treasuries. In that 
case, above normal immediate productivity induces investors to want to obtain a riskless rate that 
is greater than the required yield, but only in the short-run. One key reason is that (corporate) 
borrowers with short-term financing needs have the ability to pay this high return in the short-run 
due to immediate productivity spiking above future productivity. However, they are unlikely to 
sustain these payments over the long haul. 
Let us denote by  the immediate nominal productivity, which is a simply the average of 
last-year’s productivity and the one-year nominal forecast 
tg +Δ
1
E
tg + . Let 
10
1tg +  represent a measure of 
the yearly average nominal expected productivity over the intermediate term (ten years), which is 
                                                     
 
39 We ignore the impact of the fear-based premium in this section. Prescott and McGrattan (2001) argue that the 
equity premium measured in reference to long-term debt has been close to zero on a tax-adjusted basis; due to what 
they view is a small systematic risk premium. Note that our argument stands in contrast with Bansal and Yaron’s 
(2004)’s explanation, which relies on consumers being sensitive to nearly imperceptible fluctuations in long-run 
growth to accommodate the historical size of the equity premium. Our argument is that mean-reversion to a stable 
constant long-run real GDP/capita growth is what determines the valuation of assets. The fact that the government 
must pay a before-tax yield that outpaces economic productivity is possible if we assume that federal interest income 
taxes are in fact recycled into paying larger before-tax returns. 
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a weighted average of the one-year forecast of productivity 1
E
tg +  and long-term nominal 
GDP/capita growth, using the average mean reversion speed as a weight. Interestingly, 101tg +  is 
also a forecast for next-year’s productivity that accounts for the mean reversion of productivity 
to long-term GDP/capita growth.40  The behavior of each of these measures of productivity 
(expressed in real terms) can be seen in Figure 4. We note that all these measures: immediate 
productivity, one-year forecast and the ten-year average appear to be non-stationary, with a 
structural break after 1990. Once again, the reason for this behavior is that our estimates are 
calculated based on forward earnings per share forecasts that were overly optimistic after the 
mid-1990s. Actual book value growth (not shown here) does not exhibit this same explosive 
behavior. 
Figure 4 (About here) 
Based on our above discussion, for a ten-year hedging horizon starting at time t, the business 
cycle premium is given by { }10 10 101 1 ,0t tB Max g gπ+ += + − 1t+ , where again g stands for the real long-
term GDP/capita growth, the superscript stands for the hedging horizon, and the variable 101tπ +  
represents the ten-year ahead average annual inflation forecast. In that case, the premium is 
positive when the ten-year expected average real yearly productivity is below long-term real 
GDP/capita growth. Alternately, this will hold when the economy is expected to slow down by 
comparison to a one-year out measure of productivity 10tg 1+ , which accounts for mean reversion to 
long-run trend. Otherwise, when ten-year average productivity is greater than long-term 
GDP/capita growth, the premium is zero. 
On the other hand, for a one-year horizon, we assert that the business cycle premium is 
defined by { }1 1 1 1,Et t t tB Max g g g g+ + +Δ += − −10 t+Δ
                                                     
. In that case, the premium is positive when the 
economy is in the midst of a down cycle, by comparison to the one-year forecast or the 
intermediate productivity trend. An interesting case is when immediate productivity is above 
both the ten-year trend and next year’s forecast. In that case, the premium is negative and 
investors will demand a greater return than the required yield for the reasons indicated earlier. 
 
 
40 Empirically; last year’s productivity growth and 1
E
tg + are essentially based on S&P 500 book value per share 
growth as described in Appendix A. We estimate an average mean reversion speed γ of 59%. Real is defined with 
respect to ten-years out expected inflation. In this case, our computation of the ten-year (intermediate) expected 
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6. Treasury Yields and Spread Determination on an After-Tax Basis 
The goal of this section is to establish a theory of Treasury yield determination based on our 
business cycle risk approach to the equity premium and the required yield. From our analysis in 
Section 4, recall that the stock market required yield must be adjusted by including the fear-
based premium as follows: 1
E
tR + = 1
E
tg π 1t+ ++ + Φ , where 1t+Φ > 0 stands for the fear-based risk 
premium.  
Again, we denote by  the after-tax nominal expected yield on a bond with maturity j = 1, 
10, 30. Paralleling the after-tax CAPM approach of Brennan (1970), we define the stock market 
required return in relation to the risk-free rate and the added risk premia as 
follows: .
1j tr +
1
j
tB ++1 1 1E j jt t t j tR I r λ+ + ++ = + Φ 1+ 41 The variable 1jtB +  represents the business cycle premium 
as defined in Section 5. The variable 1
j
tI +  represents the inflation risk premium for a Treasury of 
maturity j.  To establish the after-tax CAPM, we add an inflation risk premium to the equity 
return 1
E
tR +
j
, to match the inflation risk premium that each Treasury yield already contains, as we 
argued previously. The parameter λ λ= >1 represents the net effect of the fear-based premium, 
given that it is already contained in long term Treasury yields 1
j
tr +  for j =10, 30. The parameter 
for the one-year Treasury is set at 1λ = 1 because we expect the fear-based risk to have zero net 
effect on the one-year Treasury, the reason being that investors prefer to lock in long-term rates 
when facing the prospect of an uncertain future catastrophic event. 
After combining the above last two equations together, we obtain the crucial result of this 
section: , for j = 1, 10, 30. When the fear-premium and 
inflation risk premia are absent, the stock market delivers the required yield, and Treasury yields 
are determined directly as a function of the required yield and the business cycle premium. When 
the fear-based premium is positive, it moves the stock market return and long-term Treasury 
returns symmetrically away from the required yield. 
1 1 1 1 ( 1)
j E j j
t t t t jr g I Bπ λ+ + + += + + − − − Φ 1t+
More importantly, it appears that Treasury yields are also compatible with the 
Fisher/Darby/Feldstein effect. Let the variable tπ +Δ  represent the near-term inflation rate and we 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
1
E
tgproductivity assumes that the one-year expected productivity +  is tracked for 10γ years (about 6.7 years) and 
long-run GDP/capita growth for 10(1- γ) years (about 3.3 years).  
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denote by upper-bar variables real rates after applying inflation rates (expected or actual) that 
correspond to the instrument’s holding period.42 After simple algebraic manipulations, and 
substituting the business cycle premia by their expressions, the above relationship for the one-
year Treasury can be rewritten as a real yield 11tr + =  101 1{ , Et tg Min g g g g+Δ + ++ − − }t
1t
 
10 1
1t t Iπ π+Δ + ++ − + . For the ten-year Treasury, the real yield is equal to 101tr + =  
10 10
1 1 1t{ ,0}
E
t tg Min g g π+ ++ − + + 10 101 1 ( 1)t t tIπ λ+ +− + − − Φ . 1+
Both the one-year and the ten-year treasuries after-tax real yields are determined in relation 
to real productivity corresponding to their respective horizon, a real business cycle premium that 
compares shorter-term real productivity to the long-term real GDP/capita growth, and inflation 
and fear-based premia. These real yields also depend on changes in the term structure of 
inflation. Interestingly, because the 10-year Treasury yield depends on 101tg + , we can interpret the 
10-year T-yield as a one-year expected yield that accounts for the mean reversion of productivity 
to long-term trend. 
 
6.1. Accounting for the fear-based risk premium 
An interesting by-product of the analysis is that we are able to estimate the size of the fear-based 
premium. We posited that the business cycle premium is zero for the thirty-year Treasury in 
comparison to the required yield. This implies that: 30 301 1 1 ( 1)
E
t t tr g Iπ λ 1t+ + + += + + − − Φ
30 30
1 1 1( 1)
E
t t t tg rπ λ
. Rewriting 
this equation, we get that the difference 1I+ + ++ − = − Φ − + , or that  
30 30
1 1 1
1 1
E
t t t
t
g r Iπ
λ
+ + +
+
+ − +Φ = − , which must be positive when there is a fear-based premium. 
Assuming that the fear-premium is fully symmetrical for Treasuries yields and the stock market 
return ( λ = 2), we get that the fear premium should only be applied when 
; in other words, the (positive) fear premium is the difference 
between the nominal required yield and the after-tax nominal thirty-year Treasury yield, net of 
the inflation risk premium. Thus, periods when the after-tax thirty-year yield is below the 
30
1 (
E
t tMax g rπ+ +Φ = + − 301 1,0)t tI+ +1 +
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
1
E
tR41 It is important to note that here we use the variable +  which is different from the final required stock market 
return  used in our valuation formula, since the latter variable accounts for Treasury arbitrages, while the former 
does not. 
1
E
tk +
42 The only exception is that the real productivity measure 1
E
tg +  is based on the 10-year expected inflation rate. 
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nominal required yield should be a strong indicator that a fear-based premium is present.43 When 
we incorporate the fear premium in our stock market valuation formula (8), we are able to fit the 
actual S&P 500 forward earnings yield very tightly after the second quarter of 2002, in contrast 
to the Fed model (Figure 3). This suggests that stock market valuation might have been under the 
influence of a fear premium from Q2 2002 till Q3 2006. 
Figure 5 shows that the fear premium was positive during the 1994 Mexican Peso crisis, the 
1995 Kobe earthquake, the 1997 Asian crisis and the 1998 Russian default crisis. After Q2 2000 
the premium started steadily expanding till the end of our sample period in Q3 2006. During Q2 
2003 to Q2 2004 the fear premium subsided. This corresponded to a bull market period. Note 
that prior to 1993, we do not observe any positive fear premia. One may have expected to find a 
positive fear premium during the 1981 recession, the 1987 market crash or even the 1991 
recession. However, it is clear that at least in the case of the 1981 and 1991 recessions, these 
events were precipitated by economic policies that led to low economic forecasts. These 
economic risks should be contained in the business cycle risk premium. In fact, it is important 
that the fear premium be related to factors that are psychological in nature and not necessarily 
extractable from standard economic forecasts. 
Figure 5 (About here) 
 
6.2. A business cycle theory of the Treasury yield spread 
Although not consistent over time and across countries, there is evidence that the yield spread 
constitutes a good predictor of real growth and of inflation at moderate horizons (Estrella and 
Mishkin, 1996; Kozicki, 1997). Past theories of the term structure (Fabozzi, 1997) indicate that 
the term premium is likely due to a liquidity premium (Liquidity Preference Hypothesis) or to a 
price risk premium (Expectations Theories), when the yield curve is normal. On the other hand, 
it becomes a reinvestment risk premium when the yield curve is inverted (Preferred-Habitat 
Theory). More recent models of the term structure have been based on no-arbitrage conditions 
and mean reverting interest rates processes embedded in dynamic term structure models 
(Vasicek, 1977; Heath, Morton and Jarrow, 1992) or generalized to the VAR methodology that 
incorporates other macroeconomic factors (Ang and Piazzesi, 2003). 
                                                     
 
43 We need to apply caution in practice here. Our measure could possibly give wrong signals of positive fear premia 
in periods of high expected inflation, without being triggered by a “catastrophic” event. To avoid this possibility we 
trim the condition further and assume that the fear premium does only appear in periods where the expected inflation 
no higher than the historical average of about 3%. 
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Our theory is closer to the Preferred-Habitat Theory of Modigliani and Sutch (1966), in the 
sense that we posit that investors have preferred hedging horizons associated with investing in 
Treasuries, and they also select the maturity that is most able to maximize expected return within 
their hedging constraint. On the other hand, our theory also gives a foundation for determining 
these yields based on the productivity of equity capital, our modeling of the risk premium due to 
the business cycle, and the mean reversion of macroeconomic productivity. 
So far, we have implicitly assumed that the fear-based premium is invariant with maturity 
(flat term-structure). Based on our expressions of Treasury yields from the previous section, we 
get: 
 10 11 1t tr r+ +− = 101 1t t tTP g g+ + += − Δ  
10 10 10 1
1 1 1 1 1 1{ ,0} { , } ( 1)
E
t t t t t t tMin g g Min g g g g I Iπ π λ+ + + + +Δ + ++ − − − − + − + − − − Φ 1t+   (10) 
Equation (10) is the core result of this section. It states that the after-tax real yield spread 
between the ten-year and one-year Treasuries (or term premium) 1tTP+  is a function of real 
productivity growth differentials and expected inflation (and inflation risk) term structures, as 
well as the fear-based premium. This finding is consistent with the hypotheses put forth by Fama 
(1990) regarding the effect of the inflation risk premium and Mishkin’s (1991) regarding the 
effect of real productivity of capital. The term premium 1tTP+ is positive, when for example next 
year and intermediate term productivities are greater than near-term and long-term productivity. 
In that case, we are in an ascending phase of the business cycle and the economy is projected to 
grow faster in the intermediate term than in the near-term. For example this corresponds to the 
economic boom of the early 1990s; especially in 1994-1995 (see Figure 4). 
In that case, ten-year Treasuries are exposed to a greater price risk than short-term bonds. 
The price risk comes from investors anticipating rising future spot rates and that selling the bond 
before maturity would yield a capital loss. In that case, rolling over one-year Treasuries appears 
to provide higher average returns with no adverse price risk. Thus, long-term investors bid up the 
price of one-year Treasuries, and bid down the price of ten-year treasuries, to compensate for the 
price premium. Short-term investors will let this process go forward, as long as they prefer a 
lower one-year T-yield to a higher yielding ten-year Treasury, which has an expected capital 
loss. Otherwise, they will prevent the price of the ten-year Treasury from sliding down further. 
On the other hand, when the economy is entering a recession and next-year and intermediate 
productivities are less than long-term productivities with near-term productivity greater than 
intermediate productivity, the term premium is negative and represents a reinvestment risk 
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premium. This corresponds for example to the economic situation of the 1974-75 recession (see 
Figure 4). The reinvestment risk is now smaller for long-term bonds. The risk is that future spot 
rates may drop over the next 10 years. Thus, it is preferable to lock in the average rate of the ten-
year Treasury based on mean reversion, rather than risk rolling over one-year investments at 
potentially lower rates. Long-term investors will bid the price of ten-year Treasuries up and the 
one-year Treasury down. 
This leads to an inverted yield curve (for these two maturities), on an after-tax nominal basis. 
Short-term investors will not counter this bidding behavior as long as they perceive that the 
expected capital gains from selling the ten-year Treasuries renders their total expected return 
larger than that of the one-year Treasury. Otherwise, they will not let the one-year Treasury price 
slide down as much. 
The 2001 recession is an interesting case. The negative term premium is not directly 
explainable by the productivity differential, which does not indicate a slowdown; rather the yield 
curve inversion is explainable by a combination of the fear-based premium and the inflation risk 
premium. 
Interestingly, monetary policy may also cause the behavior of the term premium. A sudden 
spike in expected inflation through the term 1
E
t tπ π+ +Δ−  may result in a positive term premium, 
when the economy is on a path near its steady-state growth with near-term productivity close to 
its long-run average. On the other hand, under the same real growth conditions, when monetary 
authorities contract the money supply and inflation is expected to be reduced below its current 
value, a negative term premium (short-term yield curve inversion) may ensue. This last result is 
fully consistent with the current understanding of how the yield spread is correlated with 
inflation changes. However, our causality runs from monetary policy (inflation) to the yield 
spread, and not the other way around as may be found in the literature (Kocziki, 1997). 
 
6.3. Empirical tests of Required Yield Theory for Treasury yields and the yield spread 
The first period we examine is the whole sample period of Q4 1953- Q3 2006. The second period 
is Q4 1978- Q3 2006. The reason we focus on the post 1979 period is again that our estimates for 
Treasury yields incorporate productivity growth measures that are based on forward S&P 500 
earnings, which are available only from 1979 on. For the same reasons mentioned before, 
empirical tests of our Treasury yield formulas are conducted on an after-tax and real basis, 
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because these transformed variables are stationary.44 All the regressions and discussion of 
methods used are presented in Appendix E.  
We find that the adjusted R-squares from OLS regressions for all Treasuries are greater than 
66% in all instances. The adjusted R-squares for the 10-year Treasury are 86% in each sample 
period, and 80% for the 30-year Treasury. Based on Newey-West estimations, all slope 
coefficients are significant above the 1% level and are closer to unity for the period 1979-2006. 
Figures 6-a, -b and -c illustrate how well our model fits the Treasury data graphically. 
The yield spread is well-explained by our theory with an R-squared of 58% in the main 
sample and of 69% in the sub-period Q4 1978- Q3 2006. Interestingly, the slope coefficient 
remains slightly under unity for both sample periods. The reason seems due to the dynamics of 
our estimates prior to 1979. As we use ex-post next year’s earnings per-share prior to 1979 to 
calculate book value growth rates, we are underestimating the magnitude of positive spreads due 
to the market having overly optimistic forecasts (Figure 6d). 
We also observe that prior to 1979 the actual yield spread leads our own estimate by about 
two quarters. This means that the market appears to anticipate by about two quarters in advance 
the actual level of future S&P 500 earnings. In that respect, the yield spread can be viewed as a 
leading indicator of future levels of S&P 500 earnings. After 1979, we observe that the two 
curves are much more synchronized, which implies that the yield spread incorporates estimates 
that are close to analysts’ forecasts. More importantly, looking at Figure 6d we appear to 
successfully track historical yield curve inversions. Out of twelve inversions over the entire 
period, we accurately replicate ten of them, with one false signal. 
Table 4 (About here) 
Figures 6 a, b, c, d (About here) 
 
7. Implications: The Inflation Illusion Hypothesis, the Fed Model and Ex-Post Equity 
Premium 
7.1. The Fisher effect and inflation illusion 
Over the last several decades, empirical tests of the strict Fisher effect (absent of tax 
considerations) have shown mixed results. Ex-post stock returns appear to be negatively related 
to inflation in the short-run (Bodie, 1976; Nelson, 1976). Although, these findings do not strictly 
invalidate the Fisher hypothesis, they obviously do not confirm this hypothesis either. Ex-post 
                                                     
 
44 These results are not shown here, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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returns, for example, may serve as good indicators of ex-ante returns only under very strict 
conditions about the behavior of stock prices. What is needed is a tall order: the absence of 
information surprises about fundamentals when measuring end-of-period prices (Elton, 1999). 
On the other hand, Boudoukh and Richardson (1993) show that the Fisher effect seems to hold in 
the long-run. Many economists have puzzled over the fact that stocks appear not to provide an 
inflation hedge, as economic theory would predict. Several alternative theories have been 
suggested to explain that counterintuitive finding (Feldstein, 1980; Fama, 1981; and Geske and 
Roll, 1983). 
On the other hand, while strictly not being in violation of the Fisher/Darby/Feldstein effect, 
there is a large body of evidence showing that the stock market P-E is negatively affected by 
inflation expectations (Reilly, Griggs and Wong, 1983; Modigliani and Cohn, 1979; Sharpe, 
1999, 2001). Some economists argue that the inverse P-E (earnings yield) is a ‘real’ quantum and 
should not therefore, be affected by inflation expectations (Ritter and Warr, 2002; Siegel, 2002). 
Several academics have invoked an inflation illusion argument to explain this apparent paradox 
(Modigliani and Cohn, 1979; Ritter and Warr, 2002; and Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004). 
In their analysis of this phenomenon, Modigliani and Cohn (1979), suggest that investors 
“are plagued by a form of money illusion”. Investors appear to use nominal discount rates to 
discount ‘real’ earnings, and/or they fail to recognize the fact that inflation reduces the real value 
of the principal owed. Ritter and Warr (2002) are in the same camp and conclude that equities 
were undervalued into the early 1980s because of “cognitive valuation errors of levered stocks in 
the presence of inflation and mistakes in the use of nominal and real capitalization rates.” They 
credit the subsequent Bull market of 1982 to 1999 in part due to a falling risk premium. 
The core argument from Modigliani and Cohn (1979) is that since corporate earnings are 
indexed at the rate of actual inflation, the value of a stock should be unaffected by changes in the 
inflation rate as the capitalization rate remains constant. A simple illustration of their argument is 
to use the Gordon growth model (Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004). The Gordon growth model 
states that in a steady-state, the price of a stock is given by the value of a growing perpetuity of 
dividends. Using our notations, 
 1
E E
t t
t
D DP
k g k g
1+ += =− −    (11) 
Where  and  respectively are the long-term required return and growth rate of dividends, 
and  and  are their real counterparts. In that case, the price of the stock is unaffected whether 
rates are in nominal or real terms, since the inflation term cancels out in the denominator, and the 
k
g
g
k
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capitalization rate ( )k g−  remains unchanged.45 Upon closer examination, however, this 
argument makes the implicit assumption that a shift in the expected inflation rate results in a 
same magnitude change for both the required return and the growth rate. However, this may not 
always be the case, for example when taxes distort real returns (Darby, 1975; Feldstein, 1976). 
Another case is that of S&P 500 companies having zero growth opportunities in the long run. 
Take the case of an index (like the S&P500) where the nominal sustainable growth rate is 
given by the reinvestment hypothesis; i.e. (1 )g g b kπ= + = − , where the variable (1-b) stands 
for the retention ratio. In the long-run, expected productivity equals the long-run growth rate of 
GDP/capita. In other words, due to zero growth opportunities, the stock market nominal return 
satisfies: 
(1 )
gk
b
π+= −

. After substituting the expression for  in the first part of equation (11), we 
get: 
k
46 
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This means that when nominal growth opportunities are zero in the long-run, the stock price 
and the P-E ratio should be negatively related to the long-run inflation rate.47 On the other hand, 
for Modigliani and Cohn’s (1979) argument to hold, it must be the case that 
(1 )
gk
b
= −
 . This 
means that the real return would be given directly by the real sustainable growth rate, where the 
retention ratio applies to real earnings. Thus, inflation would have the same one-to-one effect on 
the nominal return and growth rate. 
However, in the steady state, nominal growth of aggregate earnings per share must follow the 
nominal growth rate of GDP/capita, which must be achieved via retaining nominal earnings. 
Thus, the relationship 
(1
gk +−

                                        
=
             
π
)b
 must be true in the long run. Faugere and Van Erlach (2006) 
show theoretically and empirically that the S&P500 historical market average return is fully 
 
45 This result occurs due to the approximation k k π= + . On the other hand, when we use the correct Fisher 
hypothesis: (1 ) ( )1 )(1k k π+ = ++  , the right conclusion is that the stock price deflated by the general price index, 
is independent of inflation.  
46 Note that if we assume that the required return is before-tax, we would get back our valuation formula (9), as long 
as the effective tax rate equals the payout ratio in the steady-state, which is a long-run constraint for our theory. 
47 Caution must be exercised in drawing this conclusion, since it is a steady-state relationship. A shift in the long-run 
rate of inflation would take time to be reflected in the long-run sustainable growth rate, since the real growth rate 
would drop in the short to medium run, as we explained earlier. 
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explained with this last formula, using as inputs historical average GDP/capita growth, average 
payout ratio and inflation rate over the period 1926-2001. 
Outside steady-state considerations, Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) discuss a variation of 
the inflation illusion argument: that investors incorrectly extrapolate past nominal growth 
forecasts, without considering future changes in inflation. Sharpe (2001) argues the same point 
about analysts’ forecasts. However, even though analysts’ forecasts are overly optimistic in 
levels, they also exhibit mean reversion to the same growth trend as actual earnings. 
Our theory does not rely on an inflation illusion explanation. Our approach allows for time 
varying expected discount rates and expected inflation, while only stipulating that growth 
opportunities are mean reverting to zero in nominal terms. This does not entail the presence of 
any biases in inflation or nominal discount rates expectations, as long as the speed of mean 
reversion properly adjusts to changes in expected inflation. In other words, investors should 
realize that a boost in expected inflation will slow down the speed of mean reversion and vice 
versa. To that extent, our model is restrictive by assuming that the mean reversion speed is 
essentially independent of inflation expectations.  
Sharpe (1999, 2001) finds that high expected inflation predicts low stock returns (and high 
dividend yields) and has a strong negative correlation to the P-E. In his 2001 article, he 
concludes that this effect coincides with either lower expected real earnings growth and/or higher 
required real returns. Our theory indeed demonstrates that the effect of an anticipated rise of 
inflation is to reduce the real sustainable growth rate, which reduces the real return only in the 
case of an up cycle. However, investors still wish to preserve the required yield, which is at least 
equal to the real long-term GDP/capita growth rate. Thus, in the case where inflation rises and 
the economy is in a down cycle, the real return would remain at the long-term GDP/capita 
growth level. Thus, our theory is together consistent with Sharpe’s observation and the 
Fisher/Darby/Feldstein effect.48 
 
7.2. Required Yield Theory and the Fed model 
Our Required Yield Theory establishes a firm theoretical foundation for why the Fed model 
(Lander, Orphanides et al. (1997)) appears to work empirically. Our theory encompasses the Fed 
model to account for the impact of taxes as well as inflation, and the investors’ requirement to 
obtain an after-tax real return pegged to the long run real GDP/capita growth rate. Ritter (2001) 
                                                     
 
48 In that sense, our result does not contradict the findings that ex-post returns do not satisfy the Fisher effect in the 
short-run. 
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notes that the Fed model works better empirically than other models, but should not work well 
theoretically if most of the variation in nominal rates and thus stock yields comes from changes 
in expected inflation rather than changes in real rates. 
The logic is that for the earnings yield to move one-for-one with the nominal bond yield, as 
the in Fed model, one has to assume that the nominal yield on bonds equals the real return on 
stocks, since the earnings yield is viewed as a real return. Thus, the empirical success of the Fed 
model appears to be inconsistent with rational valuation according to current theory. Whereas it 
is true that contemporaneous earnings divided by current stock price is a real quantum, because 
both quantities are deflated by the general price level, and also that nominal earnings are indexed 
with inflation, it does not follow that the current earnings yield is a real yield in the sense of the 
Fisher relation, since it is missing the effect of inflation on the principal invested. At any rate, 
the trailing earnings yield is not an appropriate measure of expected return. A better measure is 
the forward earnings yield. 
According to Required Yield Theory the forward earnings yield is determined in relation to a 
nominal return that is built up from the requirement that investors receive a minimum after-tax 
expected real return on stocks at all times at least equal to long-term GDP/capita growth. Asness 
(2003) argues that the Fed model does not provide an absolute benchmark for valuing stocks. 
Here we show that the yields on long-term treasuries are related to the market inverse P-E, since 
our approach demonstrates that both are related to a third common factor, our hitherto defined 
required yield. 
 
7.3. Why are ex-post market returns and the equity premium so large? 
Some readers may still be puzzled as to why we argue that the stock market has essentially 
returned a real 2.21% after-tax, given that ex-post real after-tax returns appear to have vastly 
exceeded 2.21%. As seen in our first section on unit root tests, we estimated the mean reversion 
constant for the after-tax real total S&P 500 return at a value of 5.23%. Our theory, however, is 
able to account for this discrepancy. Let us go back to our stock market valuation formula (8) 
and assume zero abnormal earnings growth. The before-tax ex-post market total return is given 
by: 
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Equation (13) shows how it is possible to have witnessed such a large average ex-post equity 
return over the last fifty years. Essentially, the second term on the right hand side indicates that 
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for a given rate of EPS earnings growth close to GDP/capita growth, the historical combination 
of declining blended tax rates and declining inflation expectations is the main reason that ex-post 
capital gains were abnormally high. 
Furthermore, the dividend yield has also been affected by tax trends. Given that the relative 
dividend income tax rate has declined in comparison to the capital gains tax rate by about 1.96% 
per year on average, over the period Q4 1953- Q3 2006. This effectively boosted the dividend 
yield by that same amount to its historical average of 3.73% (calculated based on one-year 
forward expected earnings). Firms still were able to increase their nominal dividend payouts 
without sacrificing sustainable growth, assuming that dividends were substituted for share 
repurchases in the same proportion as the relative tax change.49 
These effects on ex-post capital gains rate and dividend yields may contribute to the 
empirical findings that ex-post returns have been found to vary inversely with changes in 
expected inflation rates (Bodie, 1976; Nelson, 1976), since trends in inflation and blended tax 
rates (as well as dividend tax rates relative to capital gains) were all correlated over the period. 
Notwithstanding, in the absence of such trends the average stock market return would have 
been capped by the (adjusted dividend yield) + EPS growth. The adjusted dividend yield is 
(3.73% −1.96%).  EPS growth equals long-term nominal GDP/capita growth at about 5.61% = 
2.03% + 3.58% (inflation). In other words, the average return would have been about (3.73% 
−1.96%) + 5.61% = 7.4% versus the 11.6% compounded average that was observed over the 
period Q4 1953- Q3 2006. Interestingly, our adjusted estimate is very close to the average 
forward earnings yield over the period, which has been 7.7%. The fact that the ex-post total 
compound return minus inflation turns out to be 8.0%, which is also close to the forward 
earnings yield, is the main reason why observers (Ritter, 2001; Siegel, 2002; Asness, 2003; 
Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004) generally believe that the (forward) earnings yield is a real 
return.  
However, it is a well-known result (Reilly and Brown, 2006) that the forward earnings yield 
is equal to the total return when the present value of growth opportunities is zero. Our result 
indicates that we can view the earnings yield as the total nominal return, would the S&P 500 not 
have produced these abnormal positive returns due to falling tax rates and inflation rates. Hence, 
the size of the ex-post equity premium (difference between ex-post market return minus a 
                                                     
 
49 Furthermore, while there was a spike in the top marginal corporate tax rate in 1984-1986, the rest of the time from 
1971-2002, the general trend was a decrease in that rate, which may have boosted free cash flows. Sources: U.S. 
 38
Treasury yield) is also explainable in light of the drivers of the large historical ex-post returns: 
downward trending taxes in absolute and relative terms (favoring dividends), and a steady 
decline of actual and expected inflation. 
 
8. Seven Outstanding Puzzles of Finance Revisited 
Having examined the implications Required Yield Theory for stock market valuation, Treasury 
yield determination and the various sources of the equity premium, we are now ready to propose 
a comprehensive resolution of seven major outstanding puzzles of Finance: 
Puzzle #1: Why are stock market prices more volatile than expected dividends?  
Our answer: Shiller (1981) argues that if stocks prices are determined by the present value of 
expected dividends, prices should fluctuate in the same manner as expected dividends. However, 
he finds that this property is violated in the data, i.e. prices are more volatile than dividends. This 
puts into question the validity of the standard discount valuation model. Although Shiller (1981) 
assumes that both stock prices and dividends are stationary around a stochastic trend, Campbell 
and Shiller (1988a, 1988b) find evidence for excess volatility even allowing for unit roots. 
Cochrane (1992) claims that the puzzle can be explained by innovations in excess returns. 
Barsky and Delong (1993) alternately argue that changes in the permanent component of 
dividend growth can also explain the puzzle. Balke and Wohar (2002) agree that these two 
explanations are likely candidates but their tests cannot determine which alternative prevails. 
Required Yield Theory shows that the market is indeed priced as the present value of 
expected dividends, with the proviso that rational investors expect the present value of nominal 
growth opportunities to mean revert to zero quickly. Ex-post dividend fluctuations do not play a 
major role in explaining market price fluctuations, as Shiller (1981) finds. Rather, at low 
frequency (quarterly data) we find that S&P 500 prices fluctuate mostly in response to changes 
in expected earnings, inflation rates and marginal tax rates. The latter two variables directly 
impact the required return on equity via the Fisher/Darby/Feldstein effect. Because investors 
appear to price the index based on wanting to earn a real return equal to a constant real long-term 
GDP/capita growth after-tax, we do not need to appeal to permanent changes in dividend growth 
as an explanation for stock market volatility. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, ‘The Overview of the Federal Tax System”, 102d Congress (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 10, 1991) and Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002). 
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Based on our model, the calculated yearly standard deviation of S&P 500 total returns over 
the period is 26% versus 27% actual.50 On a quarterly basis, our formula tracks the S&P 500 
earnings yield with a level of accuracy superior to the Fed Model (Lander at al, 1997) at an 
adjusted R-squared of 88% for 1954-2006 and 94% for 1979-2006. 
Puzzle #2: Why is the equity premium not accounted for by standard measures of risk and our 
best asset pricing models? 
Our answer: we define the ex-ante after-tax equity premium as the difference between the 
nominal required yield and the after-tax yield on a Treasury (for any given maturity). We show 
that the equity premium is mostly explained by business cycle risk; i.e. the risk that mean 
reversion of productivity growth will not catch-up to its anticipated level. This approach enables 
us to closely match the actual behavior of after-tax Treasury yields as a function of the after-tax 
expected equity return (nominal required yield) and short-term productivity measures 
(sustainable growth rate of corporate earnings per share). (See puzzle #4 below). 
Inflation and fear-based risks play a secondary role in the determination of the equity 
premium. We are able to characterize the fear-based risk premium based on departures of the 
after-tax 30-year yield when it drops below the required yield. The argument is that these 
departures reflect flight to safety, given that the equity premium over long-term bonds should be 
zero in the absence of fear-based and inflation risk. We explain the large size of the ex-post 
before-tax nominal premium, by showing that ex-post returns did inflate due to a decline in the 
rate of inflation and downward trending tax rates in absolute and relative terms (favoring 
dividends).   
Puzzle #3: Why aren’t stocks behaving as an inflation hedge instrument, as common sense would 
dictate? 
Our answer: In agreement with the literature, we find that stock market prices are indeed not 
indexed with expected inflation. However, expected stock returns satisfy the 
Fisher/Darby/Feldstein effect. In other words, investors seek protection against increases in 
expected inflation and taxes. 
Puzzle #4: Why aren’t stock returns and Treasury yields more directly connected to measures of 
productivity/economic growth? 
                                                     
 
50 We compute total annual return (every quarter) as annualized (x4) quarterly capital gains rate plus annualized 
quarterly dividend divided by stock price 4 quarters earlier. The annual standard deviation is calculated based on Q4 
to Q4 return observations.  
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Our answer: We show that both the U.S. stock market return and Treasury yields are functions of 
long term U.S. GDP/capita growth. Short term treasury yields are also a function of accelerations 
or deceleration of short-tem productivity growth relative to long-term trends. Empirically we 
track the yields on the 1-year, 10-year and 30-year Treasuries with adjusted R-squares over 66% 
in all cases. 
Puzzle #5: Why does the yield spread appear to be a good predictor of real economic cycles? 
Our answer: The reason is actually simple. The yield spread is already a function of productivity 
growth differentials between short term expectations vs. longer term trends. These productivity 
growth expectations embed corporate earnings forecasts. We can empirically track the yield 
spread between the 10-year and the 1-year Treasury over the last fifty years with an adjusted R-
squared of 58% and an R-squared of 69% over the period 1979-2006. More importantly, we are 
able to reproduce ten out of twelve yield curve inversions over the whole sample period, with 
only one false signal. 
Puzzle #6: Why do Treasury yields and the stock market earnings yield appear to behave as non-
mean reverting processes when stock market returns are found to be mean-reverting in some 
instances? 
Our answer: Our unit root tests show that after-tax real yields (Treasuries and stock market total 
return and forward earnings yield) are stationary processes (at the 1% significance level), over 
the period Q4 1953- Q3 2006 , which is a novel finding in the literature. 
Puzzle #7: Why is the so-called Fed model, which links government bond yields and P-E ratios 
of market indexes, found to be a global empirical regularity, in spite of its perceived logical 
flaws? 
Our answer: The yields on long-term U.S. treasuries and stock market are both tied to long-term 
real U.S. GDP/capita growth (the required yield). The forward earnings yield is a function of the 
10-year Treasury yield when it provides an excess yield over the required yield, i.e. in periods of 
high inflation risk premia. Our RYT stock market valuation formula (8) validates and generalizes 
the Fed model. 
 
9. Conclusion 
In this article, we have introduced a general theory for valuing a broad market index (S&P 500) 
and for determining the yield on long-term (thirty-year and ten-year) and short-term (one-year) 
Treasuries. Required Yield Theory is founded on the Fisher effect (1896) as generalized by 
Darby (1975) and Feldstein (1976). A series of open issues remain for future investigation. 
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While we account for the term structure of expected inflation via its effect on the risk premium, 
it is somewhat puzzling that our theory based on the Fisher/Darby/Feldstein effect should 
describe well the behavior of the stock market forward earnings yield and long-term Treasury 
yields based mostly on one-year inflation forecasts. In other words, how much are our results an 
artifact of a monetary policy that credibly sustains low inflation in the short- and long-term? 
Another issue is that our theory while grounded in the concept of GDP/capita growth as the 
minimum return, does not rule out competing explanations. As the market share of funds offering 
tax-deferred vehicles has grown over the last four decades, it may be interesting to analyze how 
this shift may have affected the effective tax rate of the marginal investor. For example, an 
excess premium in addition to the 2.21% long-term GDP/capita growth rate may be possible by 
holding a tax-deferred account, if the marginal investor has a higher effective tax rate than the 
person benefiting from deferred marginal rates.  
Our model can also be extended by making the mean reversion speed of PVGOs dependent 
on inflation expectations, as investors should realize that higher inflation will slow down the 
speed of mean reversion and vice versa. The fact the market participants do not seem to correct 
for this effect when pricing the index, may constitute a lesser form of inflation illusion. Finally, 
our theory applied to the yield spread indicates that the spread may have predictive power 
regarding the level of future S&P 500 earnings per share. This last result merits further 
investigation. 
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Figure 1: After-Tax Real S&P 500 Forward Earnings Yield and 10-
Year Treasury Yield. Q4 1953- Q3 2006.
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Critical
# Lags 1-year T 10-year T Market Return Market E-P 1-year T 10-year T Market Return Market E-P Values
Slope δ -0.90% (-0.84) -0.31% (-0.53) -61.41% (-5.14) -0.43% (-0.71) -5.94% (-1.96) -2.36% (-1.47) -80.32% (-6.03) -2.00% (-1.47) 1.95; 2.59
AIC; BIC -1313; -1296 -1520; -1503 -128; -145 -1457; -1441 -1471; -1454 -1648; -1632 3; 20 -1628; -1612
Slope δ -0.85% (-0.80) -0.32% (-0.54) -62.30% (-5.61) -0.46% (-0.77) -5.95% (-1.99) -2.28% (-1.43) -77.95% (-6.43) -2.22% (-1.65) 1.95; 2.59
AIC; BIC -1322; -1308 -1530; -1516 -128; -141 -1466; -1453 -1481; -1468 -1659; -1646 2; 15 -1638; -1624
Slope δ -0.70% (-0.65) -0.26% (-0.45) -67.75% (-6.71) -0.51% (-0.85) -5.91% (-2.00) -2.15% (-1.36) -80.84% (-7.52) -2.54% (-1.9) 1.95; 2.59
AIC; BIC -1327; -1317 -1534; -1524 -129; -139 -1476; -1466 -1491; -1481 -1668; -1658 1; 11 -1645; -1634
Slope δ -0.90% (-0.84) -0.29% (-0.49) -74.07% (-8.52) -0.54% (-0.92) -7.95% (-2.68) -2.52% (-1.59) -83.57% (-9.26) -2.80% (-2.12) 1.95; 2.59
AIC; BIC -1330; -1323 -1544; -1538 -129; -136 -1485; -1479 -1488; -1481 -1675; -1668 -1; 6 -1652; -1646
Slope δ -1.11% (-1.03) -0.31% (-0.53) -79.60% (-11.80) -0.55% (-0.95) -9.43% (-3.23) -2.78% (-1.77) -85.31% (-12.51) -2.97% (-2.29) 1.95; 2.59
AIC; BIC -1334; -1331 -1553; -1550 -129; -132 -1493; -1489 -1493; -1490 -1684; -1681 -2; 1 -1662; -1659
Slope δ -6.20% (-2.57) -3.19% (-2.01) -102.05% (-6.80) -3.43% (-1.87) -20.64% (-3.87) -13.12% (-3.59) -94.23% (-6.6) -14.87% (-3.75)
  Drift β0 0.38% (2.44) 0.22% (1.95) 11.97% (4.21) 0.26% (1.73) 0.27% (3.32) 0.23% (3.26) 4.37% (2.42) 0.33% (3.45)
AIC; BIC -1317; -1297 -1521; -1501 -113; -133 -1458; -1438 -1480; -1460 -1657; -1637 -1, 19 -1639; -1619
Slope δ -5.90% (-2.47) -3.05% (-1.95) -96.25% (-7.19) -3.60% (-1.98) -19.50% (-3.80) -11.90% (-3.35) -89.43% (-6.93) -15.22% (-4.02)
  Drift β0 0.36% (2.36) 0.21% (1.88) 11.44% (4.20) 0.27% (1.83) 0.26% (3.21) 0.20% (3.02) 4.26% (2.40) 0.33% (3.66)
AIC; BIC -1325; -1309 -1531; -1515 -112; -129 -1468; -1451 -1489; -1473 -1666; -1650 -2; 14 -1650; -1633
Slope δ -5.21% (-2.20) -2.62% (-1.67) -96.25% (-8.33) -3.67% (-2.05) -18.21% (-3.68) -10.43% (-2.99) -90.37% (-8.04) -16.24% (-4.52)
  Drift β0 0.32% (2.14) 0.18% (1.62) 11.61% (4.49) 0.27% (1.87) 0.24% (3.07) 0.18% (2.65) 4.45% (2.56) 0.36% (4.09)
AIC; BIC -1329; -1315 -1535; -1521 -111; -124 -1477; -1464 -1498; -1485 -1673; -1660 -4; 10 -1659; -1646
Slope δ -5.74% (-2.44) -2.63% (-1.69) -95.41% (-10.14) -3.76% (-2.13) -22.35% (-4.66) -11.57% (-3.41) -910.58% (-9.77) -16.69% (-4.93)
  Drift β0 0.35% (2.31) 0.18% (1.63) 11.64% (4.76) 0.28% (1.93) 0.29% (3.75) 0.19% (3.00) 4.56% (2.68) 0.37% (4.42)
AIC; BIC -1333; -1323 -1545; -1535 -109; -119 -1487; -1477 -1500; -1490 -1682; -1671 -6; 4 -1669; -1659
Slope δ -6.24% (-2.69) -2.80% (-1.83) -92.18% (-13.38) -3.45% (-1.96) -24.07% (-5.35) -11.87% (-3.62) -89.38% (-13.01) -15.73% (-4.92)
  Drift β0 0.37% (2.49) 0.19% (1.76) 11.36% (4.93) 0.25% (1.75) 0.30% (4.16) 0.20% (3.13) 4.60% (2.77) 0.34% (4.33)
AIC; BIC -1339; -1332 -1554; -1548 -108; -114 -1494; -1487 -1508; -1501 -1692; -1685 -8; -1 -1678; -1671
Slope δ -6.07% (-2.49) -2.85% (-1.68) -102.00% (-6.78) -3.40% (-1.86) -22.46% (-3.98) -13.59% (-3.68) -94.25% (-6.55) -14.87% (-3.61)
  Drift β0 0.43% (2.24) 0.25% (2.03) 11.43% (2.32) 0.27% (1.52) 0.42% (3.15) 0.29% (3.03) 3.10% (0.89) 0.33% (2.56)
Trend β1 0.00% (-0.42) 0.00% (-0.59) 0.00% (-0.23) 0.00% (-0.10) 0.00% (-1.37) 0.00% (-0.92) 0.00% (0.42) 0.00% (-0.01)
AIC; BIC -1315; -1292 -1520; -1496 -115; -138 -1456; -1433 -1480; -1457 -1656; -1633 1; 24 -1637; -1613
Slope δ -5.72% (-2.39) -2.75% (-1.65) -96.25% (-7.17) -3.60% (-1.98) -21.01% (-3.99) -12.31% (-3.43) -89.41% (-6.91) -15.23% (-3.87)
  Drift β0 0.41% (2.21) 0.23% (1.94) 11.42% (2.37) 0.27% (1.58) 0.38% (2.99) 0.26% (2.80) 3.45% (1.00) 0.33% (2.72)
Trend β1 0.00% (-0.49) 0.00% (-0.54) 0.00% (0.01) 0.00% (-0.05) 0.00% (-1.25) 0.00% (-0.85) 0.00% (0.27) 0.00% (-0.02)
AIC; BIC -1324; -1304 -1530; -1510 -114; -134 -1466; -1446 -1489; -1469 -1665; -1645 0; 19 -1647; -1627
Slope δ -5.01% (-2.10) -2.19% (-1.31) -96.31% (-8.31) -3.67% (-2.04) -19.50% (-3.84) -10.77% (-3.06) -90.35% (-8.02) -16.38% (-4.39)
  Drift β0 0.39% (2.12) 0.21% (1.79) 12.13% (2.59) 0.27% (1.57) 0.35% (2.79) 0.22% (2.44) 4.08% (1.20) 0.37% (3.10)
Trend β1 0.00% (-0.63) 0.00% (-0.77) 0.00% (-0.13) 0.00% (0.04) 0.00% (-1.10) 0.00% (-0.72) 0.00% (0.13) 0.00% (-0.14)
AIC; BIC -1328; -1311 -1534; -1517 -113; -130 -1475; -1458 -1498; -1481 -1671; -1655 -2; 15 -1657; -1641
Slope δ -5.60% (-2.36) -2.28% (-1.38) -95.49% (-10.11) -3.75% (-2.12) -23.46% (-4.79) -11.87% (-3.46) -90.58% (-9.75) -16.93% (-4.82)
  Drift β0 0.39% (2.13) 0.21% (1.75) 12.51% (2.75) 0.27% (1.58) 0.40% (3.23) 0.24% (2.65) 4.51% (1.34) 0.39% (3.42)
Trend β1 0.00% (-0.41) 0.00% (-0.65) 0.01% (-0.23) 0.00% (0.11) 0.00% (-1.13) 0.00% (-0.67) 0.00% (0.02) 0.00% (-0.28)
AIC; BIC -1332; -1318 -1540; -1530 -111; -125 -1485; -1471 -1499; -1486 -1680; -1667 -4; 10 -1667; -1654
Slope δ -6.18% (-2.63) -2.50% (-1.54) -92.25% (-13.35) -3.43% (-1.95) -25.00% (-5.45) -12.11% (-3.65) -89.40% (-12.97) -15.81% (-4.76)
  Drift β0 0.40% (2.17) 0.21% (1.84) 12.55% (2.84) 0.23% (1.37) 0.41% (3.43) 0.23% (2.67) 4.85% (1.47) 0.35% (3.19)
Trend β1 0.00% (-0.21) 0.00% (-0.56) 0.01% (-0.32) 0.00% (0.22) 0.00% (-1.07) 0.00% (-0.57) 0.00% (-0.09) 0.00% (-0.08)
AIC; BIC -1337; -1327 -1553; -1543 -110; -120 -1492; -1482 -1507; -1497 -1690; -1680 -6; 4 -1676; -1666
1
0
1
0
3
2
Panel C: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests with Drift and Trend
-1.65; -2.35
-1.65; -2.35
-3.44; -4.01
4
4
3
-1.65; -2.35
-3.44; -4.01
-3.44; -4.01
-3.44; -4.01
-3.44; -4.01
Panel B: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests with Drift
2
Table 1: Unit Root Tests for the 1-year, 10-year Treasuries and the S&P 500 Total Return and Earnings Yield
The null hypothesis is that these time series are non-stationary (Slope d = 0). The testing period is Q4-1953 to Q3-2006. The Akaike and Bayesian 
information criteria for goodness of fit are shown on the table as well as the critical values for the ADF test at the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
-1.65; -2.35
-1.65; -2.35
Nominal Yields Real After-Tax Yields
4
0
3
2
1
Panel A: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Baseline Tests
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Figure 2: S&P 500 Present Value of Growth Opportunities vs. NBER 
Recessions. Q4 1953- Q3 2006. Recessions are in shaded area.
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 Period 1929-2001 1929-2006 1954-2001 1954-2006
3.56% 3.41% 3.56% 3.34%
1.32% 1.38% 1.31% 1.40%
2.24% 2.03% 2.25% 1.94%
Table 2: Real GDP per Capita Growth 1929-2006
GDP Growth data is from the St. Louis FED and population data is from 
the US  Bureau of Census.
Real GDP growth
Population growth
Real GDP/capita growth
 
 
 
 
 
 
Periods Variables Fed Model
γ1 = 0.44; γ2 = 0.68 γ = 1 γ1 = 0.44; γ2 = 0.68 γ = 1
Slope β1 0.80 (7.2) 1.11 (10.3) 0.99 (9.1) 1.10 (11) 0.99 (9.9)
Slope β2 0.26 (4.7) -0.03 (-0.5) -0.01 (-0.2) -0.11 (-1.6) -0.08 (-1.2)
F-stat 143 194 164 254 217
R-squared 74% 87% 84% 88% 86%
AIC, BIC -1243; -1236 -1351; -1345 -1355; -1348 -1379; -1372 -1382; -1375
Slope β1 0.63 (5.8) 0.86 (7.8) 0.68 (6.5) 0.92 (10.4) 0.75 (8.6)
Slope β2 0.27 (4.4) 0.13 (1.5) 0.17 (2.0) 0.02 (0.3) 0.07 (1.1)
F-stat 159 186 146 300 215
R-squared 87% 90% 89% 94% 92%
AIC, BIC -738; -732 -750; -744 -756; -751 -805; -799 -803; -798
Q4 1978- Q3 2006 
Obs. (112)
Table 3: Estimation of After-Tax Real S&P 500 Forward Earnings Yield Using RYT vs. Fed Model 
RYT without Treasury arbitrage RYT with Treasury arbitrage
Q4 1953- Q3 2006   
Obs. (212)
We test the Fed Model regression:                                                                          
We test the RYT regressions:                                                                       for each reversion speed i  from above or below 1 1 1 2 1  1
E E E
i t t t i tey r vβ β π+ + + += × + × +   i= 1, 2  
1
1 1 1 1 1 2 1  1(1 ) (1 )10-year T-Yield
E
E E Et
t t t t t i t
t
e
P
τ π β τ π β π υ++ + + + + +⎡ ⎤− − = × − − + × +⎣ ⎦
The variable  1
E
i tey +  is the after-tax real forward earnings yield adjusted for growth opportunities defined in 
Appendix E. 1
E
tr +  stands for the after-tax real expected stock yield. 1
E
tπ +  is the one-year expected rate of inflation. 
1
E
t
t
e
P
+  is the nominal forward earnings yield on the S&P 500. 1tτ +   is the blended tax rate on equity returns. 
Regression coefficients are obtained using Newey-West estimation, which corrects for possible autocorrelation 
up to 4 lags and for heteroskedasticity. We omit the intercept in the regressions because of the problem of 
collinearity with the real after-tax yields that are near constant. In parentheses are the t-statistics for these 
regressions. The F-statistic is reported.The adjusted R-squared is obtained from ordinary OLS, as a measure of 
overall regression fit. The Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) information criteria are reported. All regressions 
assume that the required yield is 2.21%. The parameters γ1 and γ2 represent the PVGO speed of mean reversion 
respectively from above and below. A coefficient γ =1 represents immediate mean reversion of PVGO to zero. 
RYT predicts that the coefficients for each regression should satisfy β1 =1 and  β2 =0. 
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Figure 3: S&P 500 forward earnings yield: RYT formula vs. 
Fed model. Period Q4 1953- Q3 2006.
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Figure 4: Measures of Real Growth of S&P 500 Book Value Per-
Share. Period Q4 1953- Q3 2006.
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Periods Variables 1-Year Treasury 10-Year Treasury 30-Year Treasury Yield Spread
Slope 0.76 (11.2) 0.93 (18.0) 0.90 (9.5)
F-stat 126 325 N/A 91
R-squared 66% 86% 58%
AIC, BIC -1368; -1364 -1454; -1450 -1548; -1549
Slope 0.98 (9.5) 1.04 (14.2) 0.91 (11.0) 0.92 (9.1)
F-stat 90 203 122 82
R-squared 66% 86% 80% 69%
AIC, BIC -724; -721 -757; -754 -750; -747 -805; -802
Table 4: Estimation of After-Tax Real Treasury Yields and Spread Using RYT 
Q4 1978- Q3 2006 
Obs. (112)
Q4 1953- Q3 2006   
Obs. (212)
Regression for Yield Spread:
Regressions for Treasury yields: ( )1 1 1 1 1 1( 1)j E j j j jt t t t j t tr g I Bπ β λ ε+ + + + + +− = + − − − Φ + , for j = 1, 10 ( )1 1 1 1j E j j jt t t tr g Iπ β ε+ + + +− = + + , for j = 30
 ( )10 1 1 10 10 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1t t t t t t t tr r B B I Iβ υ+ + + + + + + +− = − + − − Φ +
The variable     stands for the nominal after-tax yield on a Treasury of maturity j. 1
E
tπ +  stands for the one-
year expected inflation. g represents the rate of long-term real GDP/capita growth. 1
j
tI +  represents the
inflation risk premium for a Treasury of maturity j. 1t +Φ  stands for the fear premium. jλ  represents the
net effect of the fear premium on a Treasury of maturity j. Real variables are calculated by subtracting the
one-year rate of expected inflation. Tax rates are average marginal (non-deferred) interest tax rates.
Regression coefficients are obtained using Newey-West estimation, which corrects for possible
autocorrelation up to 4 lags and for heteroskedasticity. We omit the intercept in the regressions because of
the problem of collinearity with the real after-tax yields that are near constant. In parentheses are the t-
statistics for these regressions. The F-statistic is reported. The adjusted R-squared is obtained from
ordinary OLS, as a measure of overall regression fit. The Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) information
criteria are reported. All regressions assume that the required yield is 2.21%. The yield spread is the
difference between the after-tax nominal 10-year Treasury yield minus the 1-year Treasury yield, because
by assuming expected inflation is the one-year forecast for both maturities, the spread is equivalent to the
difference between real after tax yields. The regression coefficients should satisfy βj=1 in all regressions
for all js. 
1
j
tr +
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Figure 5: The Fear-Based Risk Premium. Q2 1992- Q3 2006
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Figure 6a: RYT predicted after-tax nominal 1-year Treasury. Q4 
1953- Q3 2006.
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Figure 6b: RYT predicted after-tax nominal 10-year Treasury. Q4 
1953- Q3 2006.
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
D-
53
N-
55
O-
57
S-
59
A-
61
J-
63
J-
65
M-
67
A-
69
M-
71
F-
73
J-
75
D-
76
N-
78
O-
80
S-
82
A-
84
J-
86
J-
88
M-
90
A-
92
M-
94
F-
96
J-
98
D-
99
N-
01
O-
03
S-
05
After-tax 10-year
T
Predicted after-
tax 10-year T
 57
Figure 6c: RYT predicted after-tax nominal 30-year Treasury. Q1 1977- Q3 
2006. 
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Figure 6d: RYT predicted after-tax 10-year minus 1-year Treasury spread. Q4 
1953- Q3 2006.
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Figure 7:  S&P 500 dividend payout, federal interest income tax rates 
and blended (dividend and LT capital gains) average marginal tax 
rates. Q4 1953- Q3 2006.
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APPENDIX A: Description of Data and Variables 
Treasury Yields: on the one-, ten- and thirty-year Treasuries are respectively series GS1, 
GS10 and GS30 and are obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED II database 
website http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/115. The series are reported on a 
monthly basis and used on a quarterly basis for our study. These series are constant 
maturity rates. The thirty-year Treasury data is only available for the period 1977-2001. It 
was interrupted in 2001 and then came back in 2006. We fill in the missing years/quarters 
between 2001 and 2006 by assuming the twenty-year Treasury plus 5 bps (obtained as the 
average difference between the two maturities prior to 2001) is a good proxy for the 
thirty-year bond at that time. Real after-tax yields are computed by multiplying the 
nominal yield by (1-interest tax rate) and subtracting expected one-year inflation 
expectations from the one-year Treasury and the one-year expected inflation from the 
ten-year and thirty-year Treasuries (prior to 1991), and the ten-year CPI inflation forecast 
after 1991 (from the Survey of Professional Forecasters). 
Expected Inflation: From Q4 1953 to Q4 1981, expected inflation estimates are business 
selling price expectations from the quarterly business survey conducted by Fortune 
magazine for the period 1947-1983 and reported in Thies (1986). We use these 
expectations up to 1981, as these estimates are more conservative than GDP deflator 
estimates for the high inflation period covering 1970-1981 and because selling price 
expectations are in general more attuned to downward competitive price pressures. From 
Q3 1981-Q3 2006 the expectations are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters 
available on a quarterly basis since 1970 from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
website. The instantaneous inflation rate tπ +Δ  is calculated as the average of the one-year 
forecast and the actual current CPI inflation rate. Ten-year forecasts are CPI inflation 
forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, available only after 1991 on a 
yearly basis.  
Inflation risk premium estimates: are end of year estimates from Durham (2006) Table 
1, from end of 2000 to July 2006. These are based on the decomposition of Ten-year 
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nominal rates by calibrating term structure models separately for the nominal Treasury 
and TIPS yield curves. The estimates are applied equally on a quarterly basis, in this 
article. For each maturity the inflation premium is defined as follows: 1 1tI +  = 0; 
10
1tI +  = (1-
interest tax rate) x Durham’s estimates; 301tI +  = 1.2 x 
10
1tI + . 
Personal Tax Rates: In this article, we use current marginal tax rates and not deferred 
rates. Dividend, capital gains and interest tax rates are all yearly average marginal rates. 
Dividend income tax rates are from Estrella and Fuhrer (1983) for the period 1954-1978 
(which appear to include state taxes) and from the NBER TAXSIM model (including 
state and federal) for the period Q4 1978- Q3 2006  available at 
http://www.nber.org/taxsim. Long-term marginal capital gains tax rates for the period 
1954-1965 are from Auerbach and Poterba (1988) and from the NBER TAXSIM model 
for the period 1966-1978 (only federal taxes). These rates are adjusted upward by a factor 
of 29% to account for the state portion of taxes (calculated using post 1979 data). The tax 
rate on government bonds is taken to be the maximum between the series of interest tax 
rate from Estrella and Fuhrer (adjusted downward by a factor of 18% that is calculated 
using post 1979 data, to bring the rate down to the federal portion) combined with the 
TAXSIM federal rates estimates for Q4 1978- Q3 2006, in comparison with estimates of 
government interest tax rates from Jorgenson and Yun (2001) available from 1953-2000. 
Via this procedure, Jorgenson and Yun’s estimates are found to dominate the period 
1979-2000. All annual tax rates are applied on a quarterly basis.   
Earnings per share (Trailing), Dividends and Payout Ratios: S&P 500 historical 
trailing (as-reported) earnings per share and dividends per share are for the period 1953-
2006 and obtained from Shiller’s website www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. On the 
other hand, from Q4 1978 on, we use quarterly S&P operating earnings (i.e. street 
earnings) rather than as-reported earnings to compute dividend payout ratios. This is 
because as-reported earnings are too sensitive to one-time asset write-downs and do not 
reflect intended payouts. 
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Earnings-per-share (forward): estimates are from Thomson Financial for the period Q4 
1978- Q3 2006. Prior to Q4 1978, we use current year’s trailing earnings per share as an 
estimate of expected earnings, for our stock market valuation model(s). 
Book value of equity per share and growth rates (productivity growth measures): is 
computed based on surplus accounting by cumulating retained earnings per share from 
1871 using data from Shiller’s website at www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. The past 
year growth of book value per share (past-year productivity growth measure) is then 
calculated as the ratio of current book value divided by the book value 4 quarters prior, 
minus 1. The expected growth in book value (one-year forecast of productivity growth) 
 is then computed as the ratio of expected retained earnings divided by current book 
value. Expected retained earnings are computed as the product of forward EPS times one 
minus a three-year moving average of past quarterly payout ratios. We use actual (ex-
post) one-year ahead earnings per share to compute 
1
E
tg +
1
E
tg +  prior to Q4 1978. After that, we 
use Thomson’s forward earnings per share till Q3 2006. 
S&P 500 prices and real after–tax total return: are end-of month ^GSPC price series 
obtained from Yahoo finance and selected on a quarterly basis for the period Q4 1953-Q3 
2006. The total return is computed by annualizing quarterly capital gains plus dividend 
yields. The tax rates applied are the long-term capital gains and dividend income tax 
rates. Because the total return is ex-post we use actual inflation measure (GDP deflator) 
to get the real after-tax return.  
S&P 500 present value of growth opportunities (actual): are calculated using the 
formula 1 11
1
(1 )t t t t
t E
t
P P b e
PVGO
k
+ +
+
+
⎡ ⎤− − −⎣= 1+ ⎦  (derived from Equation 2 in the text) where 
 is the actual S&P 500 price and 1tP+ 1te + is the actual historical earnings per share. The 
required return is assumed to be the same as our required yield that incorporates 
Treasuries arbitrage and all the various risk premia, but does not incorporate the 
abnormal growth of earnings component to avoid circularity. 
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APPENDIX B: Expected PVGO Derivation 
Let us begin with the pricing equation (3): 
 =tP 11  1
1
(1 ) (1 )
E
Et
t c tE
t
e PVGO
k
τ τ+ 1t+ +
+
− + − +  (B1) 
Updating equation (B1), taking expectations on both sides and using the law of 
iterated expectations, equation (B1) becomes: 
 =1
E
tP+ (22  2
2
(1 ) (1 )tt t c t t t
t
eE E PVGO
k
τ τ++ +
+
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− + −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
)2+
t
1t
 (B2) 
Moreover, the dynamics of PVGO expectations is given by equation (4): 
  (B3) 1 (1 )
E
t iPVGO PVGOγ+ = −
Updating equation (5) and again using the law of iterated expectations, equation (B3) 
becomes: 
 ( )2 (1 ) Et t iE PVGO PVGOγ+ += −  (B4) 
Subtracting (B1) from (B2), using (B4), and assuming that 0 ≤ iγ <1, and that the 
capital gains and blended tax rates are expected to remain constant51 beyond period t+1, 
we get: 
 =1
E
t tP P+ − 1 2 11  1
1 2 1
(1 ) 1 (1 )
E E
Et t t
t t c t iE E
t t t
e e kE PVGO
k k e
τ τ+ + ++ +
+ + +
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− − − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ 1t
γ +  (B5) 
By definition, 1 11
1
(1 )E Et t t tE
t E
t
P P b e
PVGO
k
+ +
+
+
⎡ ⎤− − −⎣= 1+ ⎦ , substituting this expression in (B5), 
and after several manipulations, we get: 
 =1
E
tPVGO +
2 1 1 1
2 1 11
1
1 1 c 1
(1 )1
(1 )
(1 )
(1 )
E E
t t t t
t EE
t t tt
t E E
t t i t
e k b kE
k ee
k k
ττ γ τ
+ + + +
+ + ++
+
+ + +
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ −− −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦− × + −  (B6) 
                                                     
 
51 Interestingly, this does not imply that the payout ratio must remain constant. However, for all intents and 
purposes if investors do not anticipate changes in the tax code, we are effectively assuming that the payout 
ratio will stay constant beyond period t+1, conditional on the information available at time t. 
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To simplify formula (B6) further, let us define the expected book value 1
E
tB +  
(conditional on information at time t) of the index using surplus accounting by 
1 (1 )
E
t t t 1 1
E
tB B b e+ = + − + + , where tB  stands for the actual book value at time t. Using our 
previous definition of the expected sustainable growth rate ( 1
E
tg + ) we see that the growth 
in book value, 1 1 1 1
(1 )t t
t tB B
1
E E
Et
t
B b e g+ + + +
−− = = . Furthermore, one plus the expected growth 
rate of earnings (conditional on information available at time t) is then given by 
2 2 1
2
) (1
t
+
+
1
1 1
( ) ( ) (1 )
(1 )
Et t t t t
tE E
t t
E e E g b g
e g b
+ +
+
+ +
−= × × +− . As previously said, we assume that =1tb + 2tb + , 
i.e. conditional on information available at time t, investors believe that the payout ratio 
will not change in periods t+1 and t+2. 
Also, let us approximate 2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1
( )1
( )
E E
t t t t t
t E
t t t t t
e k E e kE
k e E k e
+ + + +
+ + + +
⎛ ⎞
1E− ≈⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
−  (which is we realize is not 
exact due to Jensen’s inequality). Furthermore, we also posit that 2 2
1 1
( ) (t t t t
E E
t t
E g E k
g k
+ +
+ +
≈ ) , 
which in the context of the real after-tax required return equaling long-term GDP/capita 
growth, essentially necessitates that changes in the sustainable growth rate are mostly 
driven by (small) changes in inflation, and not by changes in real productivity. 
These two last assumptions together lead us to the result that 2 1 1
2 1
1
E
Et t
t tE
t t
e kE g
k e
+ +
+
+ +
⎛ ⎞ − ≈⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
Using, this last approximation and factoring out the retention ratio in equation (B6), leads 
to our final expression:  
 
1 1
1
11
1 1
1 1  1
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )
(1 )
E E
t t
tE
t tE t
t t E E
t t c t i
g kb
bePVGO
k k
ττ τ γ
+ +
+
++
+ +
+ + +
1+
⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦= − × + −  (B7) 
Finally, it is important to note that to be consistent with condition spelled out in 
condition (4) we must guarantee that 1
E
tPVGO +  is positive or negative. As long as 1tb + > 
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1tτ +  1 1
1 1(1 ) (1 )
E E
t t
t t
g k
b τ
+ +
+ +
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
>0 is implied by 1
E
tg +  greater or close to 1
E
tk +  and changes in the 
sustainable growth rate come from changes in inflation and not real productivity. 
Otherwise negative PVGOs will require that 1
E
tg +  be much smaller than . 1
E
tk +
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APPENDIX C: The Growth of Equity Shares Must Equal Population Growth 
Over the period 1929-2006, S&P500 earnings per-share (EPS) grew at a rate of 5.23% 
while GDP grew at 6.50%. Since the ratio of aggregate corporate profits to GDP must be 
constant in the long-run, net new share growth is obtained as the difference between GDP 
growth and earnings per-share growth. Over the period, net share growth was 1.27% or 
about equal to the 1.38% population growth. Similarly, over the period 1946-2006, the 
growth in total value of corporate equity was 8.98% (using the Federal Flow of Funds), 
whereas it was 7.67% for the S&P 500 over the same period. 
Because the S&P500 has been a relatively constant fraction of the overall market 
value (about 60%), and the index is on a per-share basis, it is evident that the difference 
of 1.31% represents net share growth, again nearly equal to population growth. 
It is also theoretically logical that net new share growth should equal population 
growth. In order for new shares to be purchased by individual investors (net of asset 
substitution), the price per-share cannot grow faster than wage income per-capita in the 
long run. Otherwise, new shares would eventually become unaffordable. Since total 
wages and total market value both grow at the rate of GDP, this entails that share growth 
must at least be population growth. 
On the other hand, share growth permanently in excess of population growth would 
shrink earnings per-share. The return per share would go down, since EPS growth would 
be slower and free-cash flows per-share payable as dividends would also be smaller. This 
means that investors would bid down stock prices. Furthermore, stock dilution by 
bringing down the ex-post total return may be viewed as increasing the downside risk for 
investors. In that case, the equity premium may increase, which leads to further price 
drops and thus to a non-equilibrium outcome. 
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APPENDIX D: The Interaction between Tax Policy, Growth and Dividends 
In accordance with the Maturity Hypothesis of dividend policy (Grullon, Michaely and 
Swaminathan; 2002), we postulated in the text that S&P 500 index companies generate 
free cash flows that cannot be reinvested in strictly positive net present value projects. 
Stated differently, investors are better-off receiving these free-cash flows as dividends (or 
share repurchases) because reinvesting these cash flows in the S&P 500 would not 
produce a greater sustainable earnings growth per share. 
In connection with this phenomenon, we introduce here a new assumption that at the 
macroeconomic level, tax policy on equity returns must be designed so as not to hamper 
the sustainable rate of corporate earnings growth per share.52 This hypothesis may 
appear radical, and it should be formally investigated via an analysis of a political 
equilibrium that determines tax rates in the nation, which is beyond the scope of this 
study. However, we assert here that individuals and corporations are able to lobby the 
government to still achieve the maximum economically feasible growth of corporate 
earnings per share. 
This in fact is possible as long as free cash flows are available that cannot produce 
faster growth for the corporate sector, and therefore are sufficient to cover the personal 
tax bill generated by investing in a share of the index, for the highest marginal tax 
brackets. While we are not aware of studies directly supporting our view, several articles 
(Stokey and Rebelo, 1995; Slemrod and Bakija, 1996) have shown that contrary to 
common held beliefs the evidence is not clear that higher income tax rates reduce 
economic growth. 
                                                     
 
52 Obviously there have been historical periods when taxes were predatory. For example, top income 
marginal rates were sharply raised between 60 and 80% before each world war. We consider that in time of 
political stability our hypothesis is reasonable. Implicitly this assumption also entails that corporate taxes 
are not impeding growth as well, as free cash flows must be available before corporate taxes. While it may 
seem that this hypothesis is not true for growth companies, but in fact, as long as earnings are reinvested 
and gains are unrealized, personal taxes do not hamper the growth rate of these companies. 
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The previous argument implies that the blended average marginal tax rate should 
always be smaller than the index’s optimal payout ratio.53 This is empirically confirmed 
over our sample period (see Figure 7). Formally, we assume *1t tbτ 1+ +≤
max 1
E
 where  is the 
optimal dividend payout related to the optimal policy defined earlier, with the maximum 
sustainable growth rate of earnings per share denoted as 
*
1tb +
)1 1(1t tg b R tOE+ + += − × , 
whenever . Firstly, our hypothesis implies that in the long-run, mature firms 
choose the payout/retention ratio so as to maximize sustainable earnings per share 
growth. Changes in the relative dividend income vs. capital gains tax rates will only 
affect the portion of free cash flows that are distributed within the payout interval that 
allows for maximum growth. 
*
1t tb b+ ≤ 1+
In the long-run, as t goes to infinity, the maximum sustainable growth rate becomes 
max 1 1
E E
tg g tπ+ = + + , where  represents the long-run real GDP/capita growth rate and g 1Etπ +  
represents the expected long-run inflation rate. Thus, in the long-run, the S&P 500 return 
on equity (ROE) drops if the retention ratio is larger than the optimal threshold. This is 
because the growth of earnings per share is capped by GDP/capita growth as shown in 
Section 3.1.54 
                                                     
 
53 This is assuming that earnings per share are a good proxy for (dollar dividends) + (dollar capital gains), 
which must be true in the long-run.  As an aside, the government has an incentive to capture the entire non-
productive free cash-flows as taxes. In that case, the effective payout ratio (computed as Dividend 
Yield/Total Return) should match the blended tax rate, which is confirmed historically over Q4 1953- Q3 
2006 , since both variable averaged 32%. 
54 Arnott and Bernstein (2003) argue that higher dividend payouts are correlated with higher future 
earnings growth, which appears to contradict our optimal dividend policy. A potential explanation of their 
finding is that the dividend income tax rate relative to the capital gains tax rate has generally decreased, at 
least over Q4 1953- Q3 2006 . This means that consistent with our growth hypothesis, companies could 
increase their payout ratio without sacrificing their maximum sustainable growth, which can also vary 
because of growth opportunities. In other words, when the ROE goes up, the threshold payout ratio can also 
go up. It is interesting to note that during the period 1978-1981, according to Arnott and Bernstein’s results, 
the payout ratio was moving inversely with future earnings growth. This corresponds to a period where the 
relative tax rate rose back up for dividends and both tax rates (dividend income and capital gains) went up 
too, which had the effect of contracting growth.  It is likely that higher personal taxes would raise the 
hurdle rate for capital budgeting projects, thus free cash flows should shrink with higher taxes. Hence, in 
the absence of personal taxes, and with firms’ PVGOs converging to zero, free cash flows would be driven 
down to zero.  
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APPENDIX E: Regressions Using After-Tax Real Yields 
To avoid the problem of spurious regressions it is usually recommended to use stationary 
variables to test economic relationships. While we found that our nominal before-tax 
yield series are stationary over the sample period 1953-2006 this result does not hold over 
the subsample period Q4 1978- Q3 2006. On the other hand, our unit roots tests show that 
the after-tax real yield on Treasuries and the S&P 500 earnings yield and total market 
return are indeed stationary time-series with drifts in these subsamples at least at the 5% 
level.55 Therefore, we use these variables to test our Required Yield Theory. 
 
1. Regressions Testing the Fit for the S&P 500 Earnings Yield 
Let us start from equation (8) in the main text, we are testing: 
 
1 10
1 1 1 1
1  1 , 1
{ , , }
(1 ) 1 (1 )
E E
t t t t
tE
t t c t i t
e Max R r r
P AEG
β ετ τ
+ + + +
+ + +
= × +⎡ ⎤− + −⎣ ⎦
 for i = 1,2 (D1) 
With β=1. Let 1 101 1 1 1{ , , }
E E
t t t tr Max R r r 1
E
tπ+ + + + += −   denote the after-tax real expected yield that 
applies to stock valuation. Let 11 1  1 , 1 1) 1 (1 )
E
E E Et
t c t i t t
t
eAEG
P
(1i tey τ τ π++ + + + +⎡ ⎤+ − −⎣ ⎦
1+
1
= −  denote 
the after-tax real forward earnings yield taking into account growth opportunities. We can 
rewrite equation (D1) above as: 
  (D2)  1 1 1  (1 )
E E E
i t t t i tey r vβ β π+ + += × − − +
Where  1 1  1 , 1(1 ) 1 (1 )
E E
i t t c t i t tv AEGτ τ+ + + +⎡ ⎤= − + −⎣ ⎦ε + . As long as 1Ei tey +  and  are stationary 
variables, we can proceed with OLS to test our theory.
1
E
tr +
56 Thus, we implement the general 
test that: 
   i=1,2  (D3)  1 1 1 2 1  
E E E
i t t t i tey r vβ β π+ + += × + × + 1+
                                                     
 
55 We use a uniform transformation and express all real yields based on one-year inflation expectations. 
Our results regarding the rejection of non-stationarity of these transformed series are available upon request 
from the authors. 
56 It is not necessary to have expected inflation 1
E
tπ + being stationary for our results to hold. 
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With 1β = 1 and 2 (1 )1β β= − − , and where the index i applies to the mean reversion 
parameter from above or below. The reason why we omit the intercept in regression (D3) 
is to avoid a multicollinearity issue because we expect the real after-tax return  to be 
nearly constant.  We are testing four different versions of (D3). Version 1 is assuming 
that , i.e. that there is no Treasury arbitrage, but that PVGO mean reversion 
occurs with two speeds adopts two speeds 
1
E
tr +
1
E
tr + g=
1γ = 43.6%, and 2γ = 68% respectively from 
above and below. Version 2 assume that in addition the reversion of PVGO is 
instantaneous, i.e. that γ =1 or that ,Ei t 1AEG + = 0. Version 3 incorporates Treasury 
arbitrage and uses the two speeds 1γ = 43.6%, and 2γ = 68%. Version 4 still assumes 
Treasury arbitrage but instantaneous reversion of PVGO to zero. 
Our treatment of the Fed model is to transform the variables on an after-tax and real 
basis, and compare its performance with our model in (D3). After transformation, the 
variables are found to be stationary with drift (except for expected inflation over Q4 
1978- Q3 2006). The regression for testing the Fed model takes the form: 
 11 1 1 1 1 2 1(1 ) (1 )10-yearYield
E
E Et
t t t t t
t
e
P  1
E
i tτ π β τ π β π υ++ + + + +⎡ ⎤− − = × − − + × +⎣ ⎦ +   (D4) 
With 1β = 1 and 2 (1 )1β β= − − . Where the tax rate applied is the blended rate on equity 
returns. Again, the reason why we omit the constant term in the regression is because the 
real after tax yield on the 10-year Treasury is fairly constant, and including a constant 
term would generate a multicollinearity problem. 
 
2. Regressions Testing Treasury Yields and Yield Spread 
To test our theory of yield determination we start from the equations in Section 6 
describing the behavior of the after-tax nominal yield on Treasuries for horizons of 1-
year, 10-year and 30-year. Our treatment of real yields differs from the text as we are 
exclusively using one-year ahead expected inflation to transform these yields on real 
yields. The reason is that we are applying a uniform transformation of these variables to 
render them stationary; whereas in the text, we correct for the expected inflation over the 
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horizon that matches the Treasury maturity.  As in the text, we assume here that the fear 
premium is fully symmetrical for the 10-year Treasury yield and the stock market return 
( λ 10= 2). Hence, we test: 
 ( )1 1 1 1 1( 1)j E j j jt t t t j t tr g I B 1jπ β λ+ + + + +− = + − − − Φ + ε + , for j = 1, 10 (D5) 
To avoid circularity regarding the joint determination of the fear premium and the yield 
on the 30-year Treasury, the regression equation is: 
 ( )1 1 1j E j jt t t tr g I 1jπ β+ + +− = + + ε + , for j = 30 (D6) 
where the slope coefficients should satisfy jβ =1 for j=1, 10, 30. The error terms are 
assumed white noises and the error term 30t 1ε +  is correlated with the fear premium (when 
negative). We can test these relationships as long as the real after-tax yields and the 
composite exogenous variables are stationary, which is confirmed empirically in all our 
subsamples. The regression for the yield spread is: 
 ( )10 1 1 10 10 11 1 1 1 1 1 1t t t t t t t tr r B B I I 1β υ+ + + + + + + +− = − + − − Φ +  (D7) 
where { }1 11 1 1,Et t t tB Max g g g g+ + +Δ += − −0 t+Δ and { }10 10 101 1 ,0t tB Max g gπ+ += + − 1t+  respectively 
are the business cycle risk premia corresponding to each maturity. Equation (D7) is 
different from equation (10) in the text, which assumes different expected inflation rates 
for each maturity.  Because we apply a single measure of inflation expectations (one-year 
ahead) for both maturities, this is equivalent to testing the yield spread as a function of 
after-tax nominal yields in equation (D7). Here again our theory predicts that the 
coefficient β =1.  
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